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Abstract: The association between economic and financial stabilities and influence 
of macroeconomic policies on the financial sector creates scope of active policy role 
in financial stability. As a contribution to the existing body of knowledge, this study 
has analysed the implications of macroeconomic policy interaction/coordination for 
financial stability, proxied by financial assets, i.e. equity and bonds price oscillation. 
The critical review and analysis of the existing literature on the subject suggests 
that there is also ample evidence of interdependence between monetary and fiscal 
policies and this interrelation necessitates coordination between them for the sake 
of financial stability. There is also a case for analysing the symmetry of financial 
markets responses to macroeconomic policy interaction. On methodological and 
empirical grounds, it is vital to test the robustness of policy recommendations to 
overcome the limitation of a single empirical approach (Jeffrey–Lindley’s paradox). 
Hence, the Frequentist and Bayesian approaches should be used in commentary 
manner. The policy interaction and optimal policy combination should also be anal-
ysed in the context of institutional design and major financial events to gain insight 
into the implications of policy interaction in the periods of stable economic and 
financial environments as well as period of financial and economic distress.
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1. Introduction/background and contemporary research issues’ role of economic 
policies
Fiscal and monetary policies are the most prominent and widely used macroeconomic policies in 
addressing many economic issues by policy-makers. The basic function of macroeconomic policy is 
to contribute towards the achievement of economic objectives, e.g. price stability and economic 
growth (Bank of England, 1997). Hence, as defined by the US Federal Reserve (2011), monetary pol-
icy is referred to the actions taken by monetary authority (Central Bank) to control the availability 
and cost of monetary instruments for national economic goals. Correspondingly, fiscal policy can be 
described as government’s policies of, e.g., revenue collection and spending to accomplish its finan-
cial obligations. Particular to the UK economy, Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) is responsible for the 
formulation and implementation of fiscal policy, whereas monetary policy is autonomously formu-
lated by the Bank of England (hereafter BoE; official abbreviation1). The stance of a macroeconomic 
policy can be either categorized as contractionary or expansionary, depending upon its effects on 
the supply of money in the economy. Macroeconomic policy which leads to the expansion of money 
supply, for instance, through tax or interest rate cuts would be called expansionary macroeconomic 
policy and vice versa (Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2003).
The effects of macroeconomic policies are not limited to the real economy2 as various studies, for 
instance Bredin, Hyde, and Reilly (2005), Ardagna (2009) and Arnold and Vrugt (2010), reported sig-
nificant impacts of macroeconomic policies on the financial sector. In practise, the responses of 
stock and bond markets to monetary policy are acknowledged by the Bank of England (2011), stat-
ing that bonds and equities are inversely related to interest rates due to the high rates on which 
future income is discounted.
1.1. State dependency
The associations between macroeconomic policies, the real economy as well as the financial sector 
are not consistent and have shown some dynamics with respect to the state of the economy. Putting 
it simply, the impact of a macroeconomic policy may vary under different circumstances. In support 
of this, Lippi and Trachter (2012) and Chen (2012) showed that monetary policy effects on output 
and US stock market vary according to the state of economy. It implies that the scope of monetary 
or fiscal policy for achievement of any objective could be influenced by other factors, often prevailing 
macroeconomic conditions. This dynamic behaviour of macroeconomic policy impact is called State 
Dependency. It also raises the question about the implications which business cycles or any other 
macroeconomic factors could have for effectiveness of a single or both macroeconomic policies.
In addition to business cycles, the impacts of monetary policy could be influenced by the institu-
tional framework for policy-making and major macroeconomic events impacting the economy. The 
macroeconomic events and or institutional changes in policy frameworks could result in paradigm 
shifts which in turn influence the impacts of monetary policy (see Kontonikas, MacDonald, & Saggu, 
2012; Wong, Khan, & Du, 2006). Similarly, an important aspect of macroeconomic policies is the 
structure and design of their parental institutions. Any change in the framework of policy-making 
intuitions could affect the effectiveness of monetary policy (see Lu & In, 2006; Osborn & Sensier, 
2009; Semiromi & Reza, 2010). Specific to institutional framework in the UK, some major changes in 
the past few decades can be noted, particularly the independence of the Bank of England (1997) 
which resulted in a big shift in institutional design. Certain responsibilities related to financial stabil-
ity, e.g. banking sector supervision and management of sovereign debt were transferred to the 
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Financial Services Authority (FSA) and Debt Management Office (DMO). We will have a detailed dis-
cussion on intuitional framework in the later sections. However, the point to be made here is that 
state dependency and institutional design are important aspects to be considered in a study on the 
subject of macroeconomic policies.
Most studies on this subject have been either focused on the Econometric or General Equilibrium 
approaches to gauge the impacts of macroeconomic policies on the economy. In this regard, 
Bhattarai (2011) strongly emphasized that DSGE and Econometric models should be considered 
complementary techniques rather than competitive. Apart from separate empirical frameworks, we 
also have separate approaches to estimations in this study, i.e. Traditional or Frequentist approach 
and Bayesian techniques. These are based on different theorems (Gauss–Markov theorem and Bayes 
theorem), and both approaches are fundamentally different in various contexts. The Frequentist ap-
proach is deterministic in approach, whereas the Bayesian approach is stochastic in nature. 
Nevertheless, these differences in empirical approaches may show different impacts of macroeco-
nomic policies. In this aspect, Robert (2013) cautioned that each estimation approach may lead to a 
different conclusion and we could end up with a situation called Jeffreys–Lindley’s paradox. Thus, an 
analysis of the role of macroeconomic policies and resulting policy decisions might be influenced by 
the choice of empirical approach employed to perform the policy analysis.
1.2. Significance of the financial sector
Despite their influences on the financial sector, it could be legitimately questioned why macroeco-
nomic policies should consider financial market dynamics when financial stability has not been the 
mandate of macroeconomic policy-makers and institutions so far. Minsky (1974) reported the sig-
nificance of the financial sector for the real economy quite a while ago, yet the behaviour of financial 
markets has not been incorporated into macroeconomic policy formulation hitherto. On this issue, 
by criticizing monetary policy stance in the real world, Mishkin (2011) argued that “although central 
bankers were aware that the financial sector has an important effect on economic activity, financial 
frictions were not an element of the pre-crisis monetary policy”.3 Hence, the defence of our intention 
to consider the financial sector within the macroeconomic policy mix is due to its importance for the 
real economy. In a recent post-financial crisis study, Borio (2011, p. 33) argued that “financial and 
macroeconomic stabilities are two sides of the same coin and monetary policy plays a critical role in 
both”. Similarly, Tsouma (2009), Funke, Paetz, and Pytlarczyk (2010) and most recently Airaudo, 
Cardani, and Lansing (2015) declared that financial market performance itself is important for eco-
nomic stability. It was also suggested that monetary policy by incorporating stock market prices in 
its formulation (Taylor type rules) could help reduce economic fluctuations, which could not be done 
solely focusing on the real economy only.
1.3. Scope of macroeconomic policies in financial stability
The frequent argument in favour of monetary policy role in financial stability documented in previ-
ous paragraphs does not imply that there is consensus among academics and economists and pol-
icy-makers on this subject. For instance, by rejecting the aspect of monetary policy role in financial 
stability, Nakov and Thomas (2011) argued that the optimal monetary policy should only be strict 
inflation targeting. This rejection was also revealed by Albulescu (2011) that monetary policy role in 
financial stability has not been appreciated by the Austrian school of thought. In a rather recent 
study, Williams (2012) showed that optimal monetary policy should be able to react to financial 
crises. Similarly, Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro (2010) argued that in the post-crises scenario, 
despite the fact that there is no change in ultimate goals of output and inflation stability, asset 
prices and leverage of agents should also be in the sight of macroeconomic policy makers. Mishkin 
(2011) argued that as price and output stability do not ensure financial stability, therefore, macro-
economic policy solely based on these objectives may not be enough to produce good economic 
outcomes. It is therefore unambiguous that there is an important role for macroeconomic policies in 
financial stability worth serious consideration. This is one of the considerations we are taking in this 
study.
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1.4. Macro-prudential policies
Financial stability4 and growth have been the remit of macro-prudential policies formulated by dif-
ferent regulatory bodies, for instance, by the FSA in the case of the UK. In addition, there is also an 
unconventional instrument of asset purchases called Quantitative Easing (Q.E) which has been used 
by the BoE and could be considered a policy tool for achieving financial stability. Some studies, for 
instance Benigno, Chen, Otrok, Rebucci, and Young (2013), argued that macro-prudential policies are 
welfare reducing and should not be used to avoid financial crises. In addition, Agenor and Silva 
(2012) and Borio (2011) claimed that prudential policies are insufficient for financial stability and 
urged monetary actions instead. Whereas accepting the limitations of prudential policies, Svensson 
(2012) and Collard, Dellas, Diba, and Loisel (2012) cautioned that monetary policy (interest rates cut) 
should only be used as a “Last Line of Defence” in financial crises when prudential polices are insuf-
ficient. Their caution also raises concerns as monetary policy can only take us so far due to the limi-
tation of the liquidity trap (zero bound or nominal interest rates cannot be cut further below zero). 
This limitation was acknowledged by Mishkin (2011) and could be witnessed in the present economic 
scenario.5 Cúrdia and Woodford (2011) assert that QEs are not very effective in addressing financial 
crisis since they depress the returns (yield) on financial assets.
Coupling the macro-prudential policies with monetary policy has been suggested as a solution to 
financial and economic crises. Angelini, Neri, and Panetta (2010) found that active macro-prudential 
policies coupled with macroeconomic policies have the potential to reduce economic volatility, 
though the benefits might be trivial. There is also the risk of failure of policy coordination which could 
bring adverse outcomes for the economy. Looking at the functioning of macro-prudential policies 
and macroeconomic policies, macro-prudential policies could be considered preventative, whereas 
macroeconomic policies work as preventative as well as reactive measures. These features of mon-
etary and fiscal policies (macroeconomic policy) make them stand apart. A recent study on the role 
of fiscal policy by Benigno, Chen, Otrok, Rebucci, and Young (2012) showed that fiscal policy was an 
affective pre- as well as post-financial crises policy instrument. Similarly, Mishkin (2011) argued that 
“Leaning against financial instability is better than cleaning up after the crises”. It has been widely 
acknowledged that the current global financial and economic crises were so severe that they over-
whelmed the ability of conventional monetary policy to counteract it. This sentiment also indicates 
the limitation of monetary policy and potential scope of fiscal policy as a complimentary tool for 
more effective macroeconomic policy interventions.
1.5. Fiscal–monetary policy combination
In comparison with monetary policy, lesser attention has been paid to analyse the association be-
tween fiscal policy and the financial sector (Ardagna, 2009). The phenomenon behind this discrimi-
nation against fiscal policy for its potential role in economic and financial stabilities was explained 
by Blanchard et al. (2010). These authors argued that in the past two decades, fiscal policy took a 
backseat to monetary policy in the practise of macroeconomic policy implementations. The reason 
for this seemed to be the wide scepticism about the effects of fiscal policy, largely based on the 
Ricardian Equivalence.6 Hence, if monetary policy could maintain stable output and price, there was 
then little reason to use another instrument. A distinctive aspect of this study is the use of macroe-
conomic policy combinations for financial stability as there is evidence of a consensus emerging in 
recent studies that considers it preferable to use both policies simultaneously (see Gomis-Porqueras 
& Peralta-Alva, 2010; Sims, 2011).
The notion of using more than one policy instrument is half a century old due to what is called 
Tinbergen’s Principle. This principle itself is not a policy guideline. Agenor and Silva (2012, p. 6) ar-
gued that “Tinbergen’s does not assert that any given set of policy responses will, in fact, lead to that 
solution. To assert this, it is necessary to investigate the stability properties of a dynamic system”. In 
simple words, one policy combination does not fit all and Tinbergen does not suggest any policy 
combination either. Most importantly, in the context of financial (government debt) stability, Hughes 
Hallett, Libich, and Stehlík (2011, p. 2) argued that “let us note that there will be no additional policy 
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instrument to achieve the financial stability goal (in the spirit of Tinbergen, 1952) and it is never so-
cially optimal for monetary policy to do the job on its own”.
Despite the acknowledged importance of joint policy analysis, most studies in the existing litera-
ture have only focused on a single policy. Even the studies which incorporated policy combinations 
into their analyses mainly focused on the EU and the real economy (see Jansen, Li, Wang, & Yang, 
2008; Semmler & Zhang, 2003). A point to note here which is interesting and which will also be rel-
evant in this study is Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) who found heterogeneity in impacts of 
fiscal policy on different sectors of the economy. In relation to this finding and due to country-wise 
heterogeneity, Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Weber (2012) called for a tailored use of fiscal policy 
and a country-by-country assessment of their effects. Thus, sectoral and country-wise heterogene-
ity in impacts of monetary and fiscal policies imply that we may have a very unique optimal macro-
economic policy combination for a specific context of the financial sector’s stability. Hence, it may 
not be appropriate to generalize the existing evidence of policy combinations on the real economy 
to the financial sector’s stability everywhere. On top of this, UK financial markets have several unique 
features which make them stand apart (see Yang, Zhou, & Wang, 2009). In other words, the policy 
guidelines drawn on the basis of a particular sector of the real economy of any country should not 
be generalized to the financial sector’s stability in the UK, unless and until a comprehensive analysis 
is performed.
1.6. Indistinct key concepts
It is essential that a few indistinct and elusive yet quite important concepts are defined and ex-
plained for the convenience of the reader. First is Financial Stability which has no single generally 
agreed definition, and therefore it is not as explicit as price stability, for example, which could be 
quantified as 2% inflation target by the BoE. On this same subject, according to Foot (2003) there is 
“no particular definition of financial stability”. However, it could be defined in the context of financial 
assets price volatility and generality of financial markets and institutions. An interesting and rather 
bold argument was made by Goodhart (2004, p. 2) that “Indeed there is currently no good way to 
define, nor certainly to give a quantitative measurement of financial stability”. Fortunately, the an-
swer to the question about how financial stability could be defined in an appropriate way came out 
in a recent study by Khorasgani (2010, pp. 20–21). Taking a line, somewhat similar to Foot (2003, p. 
3), it was argued that “There is no consensus on a definition of financial instability. However oscilla-
tion of some variables is often considered. House and stock prices, exchange rate and the prices of 
some other financial assets, on the one hand, and household debt growth and debt accumulation, 
on the other hand, are some of the main variables which are used to investigate the financial imbal-
ances issue.” Hence, considering these arguments, our definition of financial stability is simply about 
the price behaviour of financial assets, i.e. stock (equities) and government bonds.
Now, a legitimate question could be posed about why the particular segments of the financial 
market on which this study is focused are only the stock and bond markets? A simple answer and 
reason for this choice could be to a small extent the limited scope of this research as we are unable 
to consider all segments of the financial market. However, it is particularly because of the “wealth 
effects of stock and bond markets on the real economy” (see Airaudo et al., 2015; Funke et al., 2010; 
Malikane & Semmler, 2008). In addition to those authors, Broome and Morley (2004) also found that 
stock prices are a significant indicator of financial crises. Similarly, Campbell (1995) and David Gulley 
and Sultan (2003) gave a comprehensive account of the importance of bond market for govern-
ments as well as for private sector investors. Third and final reason for this choice is our definition of 
financial stability. Following the footsteps of Foot (2003) and Khorasgani (2010), it can be defined as 
financial assets price oscillation and financial market generality of financial markets and 
institutions.
1.7. Optimality
The second term on which there is some consensus, yet requires some explanation, is our definition 
of Optimal Policy. In this context, we refer to Mishkin’s (2011) argument that the theory of optimal 
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monetary policy starts by specifying an objective function that represents economic welfare, and 
then maximizes this objective function subject to a set of constraints. The existing evidence on the 
definitions of Optimal Policies shows that various studies use this term in a range of contexts. For 
instance, Bénassy (2003) declared the optimal combination of monetary and fiscal policies as the 
one which leads to maximization of household utility and firm profits, whereas Nakov and Thomas 
(2011) categorized a monetary policy as optimal which curtails inflation.
A fascinating point to note here is that apart from the different contexts in which optimality of a 
policy has been seen by various studies, it is also interesting to recognize that for the same context, 
the parameter of optimality has been different. Ferrero (2009) showed that optimal monetary policy 
should be flexible inflation targeting, while taking an opposite line, Nakov and Thomas (2011) ar-
gued that optimal monetary policy should only be strict inflation targeting. Hence, in these two ex-
amples, there is a difference of opinion on the optimality of monetary policy for achieving the same 
objective, i.e. price stability. One reason for this difference could be the constraints which should also 
be satisfied. In this study, we are analysing the optimality of macroeconomic policies in the context 
of financial stability. There is very few, yet sufficient evidence to support the importance of analysing 
optimality of policy combination for financial stability. For example, a recent study by Benigno et al. 
(2012) showed that optimal fiscal policy (taxes) is effective in restoring financial stability. This study 
used capital flows as the measure of financial stability. However, this study measures financial sta-
bility using stock and bond markets. In this regard, this is associated with Kontonikas and Montagnoli 
(2006) who argued that optimal monetary policy should positively affect stock market and house 
prices due to the wealth effects of these assets. In other words, this study considers a macroeco-
nomic policy combination as optimal which positively influences our objective function, e.g. stock 
prices without negatively affecting the bond market (constraint) and vice versa. The optimal policy 
combination for financial stability is to some degree unique as mostly optimal policy has been seen 
as a single policy in context of the real economy. The difference of this study from any other is to 
take it further by taking fiscal policy and bond markets on board. Furthermore, this study also tests 
the optimality of our policy mix in various contexts (discussion on policy combinations and state 
dependencies in separate section) as a robustness measure.
1.8. Estimation of optimal policy
At this point, a methodological question may arise about how this study would measure the impact 
of optimal macroeconomic policies on financial stability. More specifically, how long the positive ef-
fects of macroeconomic policies on stock and bond markets should persist to make a contribution to 
financial stability? To provide an adequately satisfying answer, this study looks into the theoretical 
as well as philosophical backgrounds of these questions and the answers appropriate to them. “The 
stock and bond markets are used as proxies for financial markets and we specifically consider the 
wealth effects of these markets.” In other words, the increase in value of assets leads to increase in 
wealth of their holders, resulting in increased consumption and economic growth (see Airaudo et al., 
2015; Caporale & Soliman, 2013; Case, Quigley, & Shiller, 2012). At this point, it’s worth mentioning 
that Altissimo et al. (2005) comparing various European economies argued that the wealth effects 
are rather more important for the British economy due to the high degree of financialization than in 
other European countries. Figure 1 best illustrates their argument, clearly depicting the relatively 
gigantic size of the British financial sector in comparison to its national income relative to other 
countries.
The wealth affects are instantaneously created with the increase in value of financial assets. A 
study by Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek (2011) found that the wealth effects are immediate and persist 
for several quarters before completely being defused. Similarly, an earlier study by Carroll (2004) 
compared various studies and argued that although there is mixed evidence, mostly the wealth ef-
fects persist into the medium term (3 years).
“The full effect happens asymptotically as time reaches infinity.” Despite the fact that the wealth 
effects are instant, instead of looking at the short term (news effects), this study will consider the 
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long-term behaviour of financial markets in response to macroeconomic policies combinations. The 
rationale is that a positive response from financial markets which persists over several periods may 
result in enduring wealth affects.
The philosophical foundation of this study is derived from positivism, which suggests this study 
will urge on adopting the scientific approach, objective measures and systematic statistical analysis 
to better understand how an interaction of monetary and fiscal policies could influence financial 
stability. Hence, this study intends to provide a comprehensive theoretical framework which pro-
vides theoretical rationale to include the most appropriate data. Having access to two policies 
means there could be four possible policy combinations.7 As explained earlier, a policy combination 
which maximizes the objective function (Bliss Point) while satisfying the constraints would be the 
most appropriate or Pareto Optimal8 policy combination. Putting it more simply, an optimal policy 
combination would lead to relatively long-lasting positive impacts on stock and bond markets, which 
also significantly contributes to financial stability through the wealth effects/real economy 
dynamics.
Considering the pragmatic aspect of this study, an insight into the current outlook of the financial 
sector in the UK is essential. It would shed some light on the scope of macroeconomic policies in the 
light of theories as well as contemporary macroeconomic and institutional environments in which 
financial markets exist.
2. Current financial outlook and policy measures
The current state of affairs in the financial sector shows a gloomy picture. Exceptional and to a de-
gree unprecedented events in the last few years, specifically the aftermath of Lehman Brothers 
collapse, led to both monetary and fiscal authorities to adopt unconventional and aggressive ap-
proaches to address the effects of the financial and economic repercussions of the crises. The BoE 
launched an asset purchase programme referred to as quantitative easing (QE) and the HM Treasury 
bailed out financial institutions including notably the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Northern 
Rock building society. Money was pumped into the financial sector through QE to try to solve the li-
quidity problems. The BoE introduced the so-called Special Liquidity Scheme*9 in 2008 to improve 
the liquidity position in the UK economic system. Similar practices were implemented by other coun-
tries like the USA, China and Euro zone countries, etc. However, the focus of this study is on the 
British economy and its relatively large financial sector. Figure 2 represents the stance of the Bank of 
England in response to the financial and economic crises and post-Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy 
episode.
It is evident from the diagram that in addition to the very active expansionary stance by dropping 
interest rates, the BoE has also used the unconventional instrument of Quantitative Easing by pur-
chasing financial assets on a large scale. There is some evidence in the macroeconomic literature on 
the intensity of the response by the BoE to the crises. Study by Landolfo (2004) showed that among 
Figure 1. Market capitalization 
in comparison with national 
income (% of GDP).
Source: World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
(2013).
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the world major central banks, i.e. the US Fed, European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England 
(BoE), the latter showed the most aggressive behaviour in response to adverse economic conditions. 
The current state of affairs represented in the above diagram clearly has two implications. Firstly, it 
indicates the severity of the financial and economic crises and their implications for the real econo-
my which led the BoE to adopt an additional unconventional instrument of QE. Secondly, it also indi-
cates the limitation of interest rates as an instrument in this particular case because of the so-called 
liquidity trap when rates are so low that they cannot drop much further. There is lack of sufficient 
evidence on the success of the Quantitative Easing measures in the existing literature due to the 
unprecedented nature of these strategies. However, there is some evidence in a recent contribution 
by Cúrdia and Woodford (2011), showing that QE may not be very useful, and it may even depress 
the returns (yield) on financial assets, even though asset purchases could be fruitful when there is 
turmoil in the financial markets. Hence, despite the fact that these measures of low interest rates 
and asset purchases were important to support the financial sector by providing liquidity, there may 
be some downsides of these measures reflected in depressed yield on assets, specifically govern-
ment bonds or gilts.
Figure 3 represents these effects on the most current outlook in this study of real yield curves of 
gilts. The outlook is very discouraging in real terms, as it is evident that in real terms, the yield curve 
indicates a negative return in the short term as well as falling returns in the long term (negative risk 
premium), i.e. between 10 and 25 years to maturity.
In such a situation, the government and financial institutions might be beneficiaries of low cost 
borrowing and high prices of asset holdings. However, the household constituting pensioners and 
Figure 2. Bank of England, 
monetary policy (rates) and 
balance sheet.
Note: Assets in Billions GBP. 
Source: Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin (2012, p. 1).
Figure 3. Real yield curve for UK 
government bonds (Gilts).
Source: Bank of England (2013, 
February).
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savers might be on the losing end. Some studies, for instance Moosa (1998), argued that the cyclical 
relationship of economy and financial markets had been weakened in the post-war period (1946–
1991). However, the financial and economic crises which started in 2007–08 proved otherwise. This 
scenario provides some support for the notion that using fiscal policy as a complementary instru-
ment due to the adverse effects of QEs may be beneficial. A discussion on this perspective will be 
provided in detail in a later section.
Similar to the bond market, the stock markets have been adversely affected by the financial and 
economic crises as shown in Figure 4, where we have value of stock index (FTSE-All) on X-axis and 
Y-axis representing the timeline. The London Stock Exchange (LSE) has faced a series of adverse 
shocks from the 4th Quarter of 2008 to 1st Quarter of 2009 before settling on a slow and long route 
to recovery. Perhaps it was the worst performance of the LSE during the last decade and since the 
technology bubble of (2002–2003).
A visual comparison of Figures 3 and 4 shows that in contrast to the bond market, the stock mar-
ket comparatively presents a better outlook after the implementations of the policy measures dis-
cussed. This contrast indicates an asymmetry to policy responses between the two markets, an 
aspect of policy that this study is considering.
In the context of recent developments to restore financial stability, it is important to mention here 
that the BoE has recently set up a Financial Policy Committee (FPC).10 As cited earlier, there is a major 
change in the functioning of the BoE since May 1997 when various responsibilities including sover-
eign debt management and banking supervision were transferred to the FSA and the DMO. Since 
then, the official mandate of the BoE has been price stability by targeting inflation at 2% of the 
consumer price index. However, in the context of these changes, it could be well anticipated that in 
future, the financial sector would also be considered in macroeconomic policy formulation, even 
though this has not been a normal practice before the crises.
In terms of the financial sector, the role of fiscal policy has not been investigated to the same 
extent as monetary policy (Jansen et al., 2008) has been. Recent studies have considered it more 
preferable to use both macroeconomics policies simultaneously while analysing their impacts on the 
real economy (Gomis-Porqueras & Peralta-Alva, 2010; Sims, 2011). Despite the acknowledged im-
portance of joint macroeconomic policy analyses, most studies in the existing literature have been 
focused on single policy implementation. The limited number of studies which investigated the ef-
fects of macroeconomic policy interactions or combination has only considered impacts on the real 
economy, and the financial sector has not been a priority concern (Jansen et al., 2008).
As acknowledged in previous paragraphs, the impacts of monetary and fiscal policies are state 
dependent. This implies that there is a prospect that optimal combination of macroeconomic 
Figure 4. Performance of 
London Stock Exchange (FTSE 
All) July 2002–July 2012.
Source: London Stock Exchange 
(2012).
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policies may also be influenced by the underlying state of the economy. Therefore, the optimality of 
macroeconomic policy combinations for financial stability in various contexts (the underlying states) 
should be analysed. There are three interesting aspects of state dependency this study is intending 
to consider: (1) analysis of intuitional arrangements, (2) alternative empirical approaches/frame-
works and (3) major macroeconomic events. There are three reasons for enriching our state depend-
ency with these aspects. First, the literature on the subject has shown a shift in effectiveness of 
macroeconomic policies followed by structural changes in their formulating institutions (see Lu & In, 
2006; Osborn & Sensier, 2009; Semiromi & Reza, 2010), for example, institutional changes in the BoE. 
Those studies indicated variability in effectiveness of monetary policy post-changes in its intuitional 
framework. There have been some changes in the structure and arrangements of institutions re-
sponsible for design and implementation of macroeconomic policies, for instance, the operational 
independence of the BoE in 1997. Hence, it is imperative to analyse the dynamics of macroeconomic 
policy interactions in the light of intuitional changes during the period of the study. Second, the 
macroeconomic policy literature also shows that either General Equilibrium modelling or 
Econometrics techniques have been used for empirical analyses. In this regard, Bhattarai (2011) and 
latter Consolo, Favero, and Paccagnini (2009) highlighted the weakness of a single framework and 
urged that the DSGE (dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) and Econometrics should be consid-
ered complementary techniques rather than competitive ones. Nevertheless, it is not a matter of 
empirical frameworks only, but the important point is that the Frequentist approach (Econometrics) 
and Bayesian approach (DSGE) are based on different theorems and could lead to different empirical 
results and conclusions, a situation called Jeffreys–Lindley’s paradox (Robert, 2013). Hence, differ-
ences in the fundamental principles of estimation could also have implications for optimality of our 
policy combinations. Third and lastly, the reason for including the contexts of macroeconomic events 
is due to the shifts of stock markets’ response to monetary policy after an episode of crisis (see 
Kontonikas et al., 2012; Wong et al., 2006), which is associated with change in market efficiency. This 
could also have important implications for the optimality of macroeconomic policy combinations.
In the next section, the discussion of some research gaps in the existing body of literature on 
macroeconomic policy interactions, particularly in the context of state dependency and the effects 
on the financial sector, will be provided.
3. Research gaps in the existing literature on policy interaction/optimal*11 
combination
Earlier studies have shown that financial markets have substantial effects on the real economy. 
Therefore, this association creates scope for active monetary response to financial market dynam-
ics. However, a major limitation of these studies was their focus on monetary policy only, even 
though recent studies have strongly emphasized joint fiscal–monetary policy analyses (Gomis-
Porqueras & Peralta-Alva, 2010; Sims, 2011). Macro-prudential policy combinations have also been 
suggested as an alternative policy combination, but have been heavily criticized for their failure, 
unlikely beneficial effects and potential risk of coordination failure (Angelini et al., 2010).
Other than urging for monetary response to ensure financial stability, existing studies do not sug-
gest any particular monetary stance in this regard. To support this position, Borio (2011, p. 15) states 
that “no such agreement as yet exists concerning whether, and if so how, monetary policy frame-
works should be adjusted to better support financial and macroeconomic stability. The crisis has 
generated much soul-searching, but as yet no clear answers”. It is worth mentioning that various 
researchers have also cautioned about aggressive use of expansionary monetary policy for financial 
market stability as it could adversely affect the real economy (see Airaudo, Nistico, & Zanna, 2008; 
Bernanke & Gertler, 2001; Giorgio & Nistico, 2007).
This discussion seems to suggest optimally combining macroeconomic policies as supported by 
Gomis-Porqueras and Peralta-Alva (2010) and Sims (2011) to achieve more effective outcomes for 
real economy. Despite the acknowledged importance of fiscal policy12 on the economy, reviewed 
literature on macroeconomic policies to the best of our knowledge, we could not find a study which 
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has addressed the issue that fiscal policy could realize the financial sector’s stability in the context 
of its importance for economic stability. Jansen et al. (2008) on the notion of optimal macroeco-
nomic policy combinations reported that the relationship between monetary policy and the US stock 
market might be influenced by fiscal policy. The study does not suggest any optimal policy combina-
tion neither does it give any insight into the effects of policy interactions on the stock or bond mar-
kets. This study, however, will take the opportunity to address the subject of optimal policy 
combinations for the financial sector’s stability. The study will also analyse the symmetry (homoge-
nous or heterogeneous) of the responses of both markets, i.e. bonds and stocks to macroeconomic 
policy interactions for the reasons discussed before. In keeping with our earlier mentioned definition 
of optimal policy combination, we can remind ourselves that a policy combination could only be 
considered as optimal if it positively contributes to one market, e.g. stock or bond, provided no ad-
verse effects are imposed on the other and vice versa.
As discussed and cited earlier, it is evident that the impacts of fiscal and monetary policies on the 
bond and stock markets are not consistent and subject to change, often led by business cycle dy-
namics. In addition, the structure and design of their parental institutions (see Lu & In, 2006; Osborn 
& Sensier, 2009) and major macroeconomic events (see Kontonikas et al., 2012; Wong et al., 2006) 
also result in shifts in the impacts of monetary policy. This implies that optimal policy combinations 
of macroeconomic policies may also vary in their compositions under the influence of business cy-
cles, intuitional designs and macroeconomic events. Therefore, this research takes these factors into 
account. However, in the existing body of literature on the subject, there is a lack of studies which 
have analysed the impacts of these factors on macroeconomic policy interactions, for the financial 
sector’s stability and for the real economy.
Lastly, an important context in our consideration of optimal policy combinations is the role of al-
ternative empirical frameworks, i.e. Econometric as well as General Equilibrium frameworks. It is 
worth mentioning that the Econometric framework would be based on the so-called Frequentist 
Approach, while estimation of the DSGE model would be carried out using Bayesian techniques. 
Apparently, it not just a matter of choosing an empirical approach because more importantly, both 
approaches have fundamental differences as the Frequentist is deterministic while the Bayesians is 
a stochastic approach. To accommodate the aforementioned research gaps, this study intends to 
achieve the following research aims and objectives as stated in the next section.
4. Aim and objectives of the study
The main aim of this research is to theoretically derive, evaluate and recommend an optimal policy 
framework for financial stability. Hence, the achievement of the main research objective would lead 
to a recommendation of an empirical framework which further based on macroeconomic policy 
combination could facilitate the financial sector’s stability in various contexts (empirical framework/
approaches, institutional framework and macroeconomic events). As the bases for reasoning, the 
study raises the following research questions:
(1)  What are the effects of macroeconomic policy interactions on financial stability?
(2)  What is the symmetry (homogenous or heterogeneous) of stock and bond markets’ responses 
to macroeconomic policy interactions?
(3)  How do the empirical frameworks, intuitional designs and macroeconomic events influence 
the composition of optimal macroeconomic policy combinations?
However, critical analysis and reasoning which could lead to answering the research questions 
could also help to attainment the following specific objectives, which would pave the way to the 
achievement of the main objective:
(1)  To evaluate the impacts of macroeconomic policy combinations/interactions on the financial 
sector’s stability.
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(2)  To appraise the symmetry of bond and stock markets’ responses to optimal macroeconomic 
policy combinations.
(3)  To evaluate the implications of the empirical frameworks, intuitional designs and major mac-
roeconomic events on the optimality of macroeconomic policy combinations.
The first and second specific objectives are limited to the overall impacts of macroeconomic poli-
cies on the financial sector’s stability. The rationale behind this exercise is that: (1) it would help 
understand the symmetry of stock and bond markets’ responses to a particular macroeconomic 
policy combination, (2) it would also help analyse how the impacts and composition of “optimal 
policy mix” change when analysis is limited to one sector, i.e. equity (stocks) markets or bond mar-
kets, and vice versa. However, in the third specific objective, we would analyse the robustness of our 
optimal policy mix in the light of alternative empirical approaches, institutional changes and major 
macroeconomic events. The achievement of the third objective would help us understand the influ-
ences of intuitional designs, macroeconomic events and empirical approach/framework choices on 
the optimality of the suggested policy combinations.
5. Rationale and contributions of research
Major factors which provide grounds for this research include the significance of financial stability for 
real economy’s stability and scope of policy combination in this context. Certainly, in the light of re-
search gaps acknowledged in the previous section, there is a need for the formulation of macroeco-
nomic policies which could assist in the financial sector’s stability due to its importance for the real 
economy. The particular segments of financial market on which this study is focused are the stock 
and bond markets. One reason for this choice is the limited scope of this research but also particu-
larly because of the wealth effects of stock and bond markets on the economy (see Airaudo et al., 
2015; Funke et al., 2010; Malikane & Semmler, 2008). In addition, Broome and Morley (2004) found 
that stock prices are significant indicators of financial crises. Third and finally, the reason for this 
choice is due to our definition of financial stability, which follows Foot (2003) and Khorasgani (2010), 
as financial assets price volatility. There are several reasons for the choice of UK as the financial sec-
tor rather than any other: including, (1) the relative size and significance of the financial sector for the 
British economy as well as international financial system, (2) the availability of reliable data from 
credible sources and (3) how well established the macroeconomic policy-making intuitions and fi-
nancial markets are.
This study is to (1) address the problem of future policy formulation, also in case of conflicting 
stances of monetary and fiscal authorities, e.g. non-coordinating monetary and fiscal policy-makers. 
It is to take it further by, (2) bringing fiscal policy on board and finding optimal combination of mon-
etary and fiscal policies which could facilitate stock as well as bond markets, (3) it will also test the 
optimality of our policy mix in various contexts to understand the dynamics of policy interactions in 
different circumstances and their implications for the financial sector’s stability. Hence, the contri-
butions made by this study would have three remarkable aspects, i.e. pragmatism, theoretical con-
text and its innovation to the application of methodology. The details are explained in the following 
sections.
5.1. Pragmatism
A significant, perhaps most important aspect of this study is its practicability and pragmatism. 
Though the coordination among macroeconomic policies has been widely perceived as beneficial, 
this may not be the case in practise as Niemann and Hagen (2008) accused independent central 
banks of being reluctant to coordinate with fiscal authorities. In particular to the analysis of the UK 
economy, Fragetta and Kirsanova (2010) also showed that fiscal and monetary policies act in a non-
cooperative manner. They did not however mention the cause of non-cooperation, its implications 
for the financial sector or the economy and neither gave any recommendations for future policy 
formulation.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
ee
ds
 B
ec
ke
tt U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
6:0
5 0
4 M
arc
h 2
01
6 
Page 13 of 36
Ali Nasir et al., Cogent Business & Management (2016), 3: 1154283
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2016.1154283
In the context of the present economic scenario, this study provides new perspectives for future 
policy formulation. An important practical contribution is the incorporation of the financial sector in 
macroeconomic policy formulation. The rationale to bring financial (stock and bond) markets analy-
sis to the fore is strengthened by the BoE’s recent efforts to ensure financial stability and the launch 
of the FPC. This research also considers state-dependent impacts of policy combinations in the pres-
ence of various institutional arrangements and macroeconomic events. This particular feature of the 
study makes it very pragmatic as we would be able to see how intuitional designs and macroeco-
nomic events define the ability of policies and the contexts in which they are formulated.
5.2. Theoretical context
On the theoretical context, we may not be able to come up with a unified theory on macroeconomic 
policy interactions, financial sector’s stability and state dependency as it is a nexus of theories. To 
some extent, we can associate this study as mentioned earlier with Minsky (1974) and his recently 
well-publicized theory of Financial Instability Hypothesis. Despite being limited to private sector 
debt, this theory would still be categorized as pioneering in highlighting the financial sector’s impor-
tance for the real economy. Secondly, with regard to the policy interactions, it might be observed 
that this study in the light of the FTPL emphasized fiscal policy as complimentary to monetary policy. 
It stemmed from the empirical work of Sargent and Wallace (1981) and their remarkable arguments 
that the Friedman’s list of the things that monetary policy cannot permanently control may have to be 
expanded to include inflation. This theory refutes the concept of the Ricardian Equivalence according 
to which fiscal policy has no real impact on the economy.
Further to these interesting economic theories, a well-known study by Dixit and Lambertini (2003) 
also emphasized the importance of cooperation between fiscal and monetary authorities in order to 
achieve a desirable outcome, for that they coined the term “Symbiosis”. To add values to these cited 
theories, our study is to take it further and bring the financial sector stability into consideration. We 
would analyse the effectiveness of fiscal policy by the FTPL and Dixit and Lambertini’s (2003) strat-
egy of symbiosis could be helpful in the formulation of an optimal macroeconomic policy combina-
tion for financial stability due to its importance for economy as acknowledged by Minsky (1974).
5.3. Methodological innovations
This study makes a significant addition to the existing literature on the subject area. This study criti-
cally reasons the option of alternative empirical frameworks, i.e. DSGE and Econometric frameworks, 
for comparison, robustness and overcoming limitations of a particular framework. Furthermore, it 
gives a detailed insight into the estimation of the empirical models which could also be carried out 
using alternative approaches, i.e. the Econometric model by traditional or Frequentist and the DSGE 
model by Bayesian estimation approach. We would have detailed discussion on both approaches in 
the next section. The methodological contribution also has a practical aspect as it would elaborate 
how the choice of empirical framework affects the outcome and resulting policy formulation.
6. Structure of the study
The study consists of three sections which includes the introduction as the first section. The second 
section will comprehensively review the existing literature on macroeconomic policies, their impact 
on financial markets and evidence on policy interaction. It will also provide in-depth discussion and 
insight into the Bayesian approach (based on Bayes’ theorem) and Frequentist approach (Gauss 
Theorem). It would give readers insights into our methodological choices and their impacts on opti-
mal policy mixes, i.e. whether our optimal policy combination is robust against the Jeffreys–Lindley’s 
paradox. Moreover, we will also look at two important elements: firstly, the implications of institu-
tional arrangements and design of macroeconomic policy-making intuitions and secondly, shedding 
some light on the impact of macroeconomic events for the dynamics of the relationship between 
the financial sector and macroeconomic policy combinations.
Third, section three would give us an insight into the financial sector (bond and equity markets) of 
the UK economy. In this regard, some descriptive historical statistics would also be provided to give 
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the reader a flavour of the subject of the financial sector and its background. Furthermore, the mac-
roeconomic policy framework, its performance in the last few decades and evidence on its relation-
ship with the financial sector would also be acknowledged. Conclusions will be drawn on the basis of 
in-depth and critical discussion and logical reasoning, and critical review of existing and prevailing 
wisdom. Moreover, the implications and contributions to macroeconomic policy formulation would 
also be described. In the last section, some indication towards potential extensions for future re-
search will be suggested.
7. Review of existing evidence on macroeconomic policy’s role in the financial sector
In this section, we will comprehensively review the existing literature on macroeconomic policies, 
their impact on financial markets and evidence on policy interaction.
7.1. Macroeconomic policy interaction
Despite ample effort, we could not evident ample evidence on the impact of macroeconomic policy 
interaction on the financial sector; however, its influence on real economy would be acknowledged 
to highlight and establish its importance. Regardless of the limited attention paid to the joint analy-
sis of macroeconomic policies and their interaction, its significance has been frequently acknowl-
edged and increasingly emphasized in recent past. There are a number of current studies we would 
review, yet the comments by Leeper (1993, p. 3) are very important in this context that …
Analysing one policy is like dancing a tango solo: it’s a lot easier, but it is incomplete and 
ultimately unfulfilling.
Indeed, analysing one policy is quite easy; however, it neither shows the complete picture nor 
leads to a desired outcome. Nevertheless, the arguments by Isaac (2009) are also very interesting 
on the issue of macroeconomic policy mix. Analysing the interaction between monetary and fiscal 
policies in the long and short run, it was argued that …
The macroeconomic stability does not depend on particular fiscal or monetary policy but on 
a mix of these policies.
It was also showed that the monetary policy could also overcome the inflationary effects of ex-
pansionary fiscal policy, for instance, by influencing inflation expectation by changing its targets. We 
should also acknowledge the arguments Hughes Hallett and Libich (2007) made, that “it is impor-
tant to take the government’s intentions into account, as well as those of the central bank, if we are 
to get a realistic picture of the effectiveness of the policies and policy institutions in any economy.” 
The comparative analysis of fiscal and monetary policies’ effects on economy by Dungey and Fry 
(2009) showed that the overall impact of fiscal policy shocks has been larger than monetary policy 
shocks. In addition, among fiscal instruments, taxation and debt policy shocks have been more sig-
nificant than government expenditure shocks. Nevertheless, they compare the magnitude of the 
policy effects, however, as the both fiscal and monetary policies operate simultaneously and there 
is substantial evidence of interaction in this section; analysing effects of only one policy exclusively 
may conceal the effects of policy interaction.
In particular to the UK, the monetary and fiscal policies are formulated by separate institutions. 
The interaction is important as it may influence the real economy as well as financial sector’s stabil-
ity; moreover, the conflicting and coordinating policies may have various implications for economy. 
The interaction is also important as macroeconomic policies may influence actions of each other; in 
this context, Neri (2003) observed that as fiscal policy was introduced in the VAR model, the effect of 
monetary policy decreased to almost half. In a study with similar outcome, where fiscal policy acts 
as a stabilizer of government debt under various forms of monetary policy, von Thadden (2004) 
found that the monetary policy may restrict fiscal policy as additional fiscal restraint may be needed 
under strict inflation targeting which was not required under a constant money growth rule. Similarly, 
analysing coordination of economic policies and its effects on economy, Barnett (2005) urged that 
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the fiscal and monetary authorities should coordinate with each other as the fiscal policy often puts 
some constraints on monetary policy. Moreover, the central bank inflation targeting should be cou-
pled with fiscal constraints. In recent cases of reporting inter-dependence between macroeconomic 
policies, Zubairy (2009) and rather later Davig and Leeper (2011) also showed that the strong action 
of monetary policy can restrain the effects of fiscal policy. Consequently, policies influence the role 
of each other; therefore, their interaction cannot be overlooked.
7.2. Coordinating macroeconomic policies’ “symbiosis”
In their study, Dixit and Lambertini (2001) argued that the interaction of the both fiscal and mone-
tary is a recent phenomenon and it has gained importance in the field of economic policy formula-
tion as several studies have considered the interaction of monetary and fiscal policies. They 
emphasized the coordination between monetary and fiscal policies and cautioned that the non-co-
operative behaviour can cause low output growth and high rate of inflation, but if the authorities’ 
preferences coincide, the ideal growth and inflation is attainable. In case of disagreement, the out-
come can be influenced by institution design; therefore, it was recommended that giving a leader-
ship role to either monetary of fiscal authority can be fruitful. Latter investigation by Dixit and 
Lambertini (2003) showed almost similar findings that the optimal results are achieved by consen-
sus of fiscal and monetary authorities on the desirable level of output and inflation, for which they 
coined the, later became famous, term “Symbiosis”. Similar and recent study on European Monetary 
Union (EMU) where monetary policy is formulated at union level (European Central Bank) but fiscal 
policy is formulated at country level, Ferré (2008) also emphasized that EMU should adopt coordina-
tion and exchange of information in fiscal policies as it affects economies in EMU.
In the context of “Symbiosis” discussed in previous paragraphs, a recent study by Di Bartolomeo 
and Giuli (2011) on macroeconomic policy interaction showed that the symbiosis suggested by Dixit 
and Lambertini (2003) does not hold under uncertainty effects on monetary policy. They argued that 
macroeconomic policy uncertainties are not symmetric and could affect economy. Moreover, the 
role of monetary policy under uncertainty could be affected by fiscal stance. However, in the context 
of coordination, they unanimously supported the theme; they cautioned on viewing monetary and 
fiscal institutions as separate entities and urged for coordination in uncertain economic scenario.
For the achievement of economic objectives, Bénassy (2003) emphasized that the optimal combi-
nation (household utility and firm profit maximized) of monetary and fiscal policies leads to better 
outcomes, even when information available to the policy-makers is constrained. In a recent study on 
dimension of information, the coordination among macroeconomic policies was investigated by 
Nasir, Ahmad, Ali, and Rehman (2010). Although they reported that there had been very week coor-
dination between macroeconomic policies, yet they emphasized on more coordination and ex-
change of information among policy-makers for economic stabilization. Similarly, seeing coordination 
in the light of openness and integration of financial markets, empirical results by Pierdzioch (2004) 
showed that the higher capital mobility does not reduce the effectiveness of fiscal policy and it is 
important to consider the interaction of fiscal and monetary policies while considering the integra-
tion of financial markets as the fiscal policy shocks propagate through an open economy.
Macroeconomic policy coordination is also important due to the inter-dependence between mac-
roeconomic policies as reported in a recent study by Andrew, Libich, and Stehlik (2011). They found 
that the macroeconomic policies have spill-over effects on each other, and therefore even formu-
lated independently, they are interdependent. In the medium term, coordination is more important 
in the context of ambition than conservatism. The coordination is important even when the policies 
have different objectives, as in non-coordination (Nash Equilibrium) they fall in “tug-of-war”. They 
suggested that the coordination should not be limited to exchange of information but extended to 
details of each policy. However, they did not provide empirical support to their arguments nor any 
framework on policy coordination.
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7.3. Absence of policy coordination and consequence
Macroeconomic policy interaction is also important for the reason that the conflicting and coordi-
nating policies could have different implications for economy. In this context, Hughes Hallett and 
Libich (2007) showed that the absence of coordination is damaging for policies’ credibility; moreo-
ver, it leads towards economic instability. They also declared it necessary to take fiscal and mone-
tary policies’ intentions into account to get a realistic picture of the effectiveness of the policies and 
policy institutions. Similarly, Chadha and Nolan (2007) investigated monetary and fiscal interaction 
and found that the design of optimal stabilization policy requires consideration of both monetary 
and fiscal plans. Moreover, “passive” fiscal policy necessitates large long run responses to inflation 
from monetary policy and aggressive monetary policy may result in an aggressive set of fiscal plans. 
Similarly, analysing the macroeconomic policy interaction in Romania, Talvan and Lupu (2010) ar-
gued that for economic and price stabilities, the monetary policy needs to be supplemented by fiscal 
policy. However, they went further and also cautioned that the non-coordination between policies 
could not only lead to economic instability but also social unrest.
A major factor leading to popularity of coordination between fiscal and monetary policies was 
adverse outcome in the case of conflict between policies, supported by the work of Leitemo (2004), 
as they cautioned that the Nash game between an inflation-targeting central bank and the fiscal 
policy authorities may lead to strong interest rate and exchange rate fluctuations due to a conflict 
over the output gap. Economic fluctuations can be harmful to the financial stability of an open 
economy; therefore, fiscal policy should support the monetary policy objective to a greater extent. 
Similarly, the study by Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) also supported the view that the fiscal and 
monetary policies should be coordinated for welfare gains in monetary union. Passive fiscal policy 
would be better than non-cooperative fiscal policy; however, non-cooperative fiscal policy can be a 
better choice if monetary policy is non-cooperative. Most of these studies had been on European 
Union economy which has its idiosyncratic policy framework, whereas in the UK, both monetary and 
fiscal policies are formulated at country level.
Analysing macroeconomic policy interaction in Croatian economy in an Econometric framework 
(Structural VECM model) empirical analysis by Rukelj (2009) showed that the fiscal policy and mon-
etary policy showed negative impacts on each other, which showed that they moved in opposite 
directions; therefore, they were categorized as substitutes. However, they did not incorporate the 
outcome of conflicting stance, which might be due to the limited empirical framework.
Specific to an aspect of the financial sector (Forex markets), study by Giorgio and Nistico (2008) 
showed that in the case of counter cyclical fiscal policy, fiscal discipline plays an important role in the 
movement of exchange rates and Net Foreign Assets. “Most importantly, they cautioned that mon-
etary authority’s solo efforts to stabilize the financial sector (Net foreign Assets) fluctuation may 
results in high volatility of Forex.” Similarly, appreciating the macroeconomic policy coordination, 
Hanif and Arby (2009) argued that the monetary and fiscal measures may conflict with each other; 
poor coordination could lead to financial instability (interest rates and Forex volatility) high inflation 
and instable growth. In their economy analysis of Pakistan, the Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
Coordination Board had been established for the purpose. However, in their later study, Arby and 
Hanif (2010) showed that the monetary policy stance has shown a poor coordination with fiscal 
policy in Pakistan. The institutional arrangements, i.e. establishment of Monetary and Fiscal Policies 
Coordination Board, could not contribute towards coordination. This finding would be interesting in 
the UK context as the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the BoE responsible for formulation of 
monetary policy has representation of fiscal authority (HM Treasury); our empirical findings in this 
study would give us further insight if this arrangement had been successful for policy coordination.
7.4. Fiscal coordination for monetary policy objectives
The prime objective of a monetary authority is price stability; however, it may not be achievable by 
monetary policy on its own as a study by Beetsma and Jensen (2005) found that a negative supply 
shock raises the inflation and requires fiscal contraction. They also urged that there is more fiscal 
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coordination needed in Europe as the fiscal policies are formulated in national interest. Similar study 
by Eichengreen (2005) criticized monetary and fiscal policy framework and SGP poor performance as 
the European Commission cannot fully enforce fiscal policy matters. They also urged for cooperation 
from fiscal authorities.
Analysing the influence of fiscal policy on monetary policy role, Doughty (1991) argued that the 
fiscal policy stance influences the role of monetary policy and inflation at two levels: (a) in the short 
term, fiscal policy affects the transmission of monetary policy (b) while in the long term, it affects the 
sustainability of monetary policy. The channels through which it influences monetary policy are do-
mestic demand, interest rates, capital market effects and inflation effects. In practice, fiscal policy 
affects the monetary policy inflation-targeting strategy. Moreover, the sustainability of fiscal policy 
(debt stabilization) also affects monetary policy objective achievements in the long term. Therefore, 
it was urged that the fiscal stance should be considered for monetary policy price stability objective 
and overall policy framework. In a later study, investigating importance of fiscal cooperation for 
monetary policy, Forlati (2006) argued that in an open economy scenario, there is incentive for fiscal 
policy to use the tax instrument. Therefore, it was argued the fiscal policy cooperation is important 
for monetary policy. Later study with similar outcome by Schabert (2006) showed that the monetary 
policy objective of price stability relies on fiscal policy stance. The monetary policy should not behave 
aggressively towards achievement of its object, yet fiscal policy should also support (balanced budg-
et) monetary policy objective.
In recent evidence, analysing the effects of monetary and fiscal policies’ interaction in the context 
of fiscal policy effect on monetary role in price stability, investigation by Libich et al. (2011) showed 
that the effects of undisciplined fiscal policy can spill over to monetary policy role in price stability. It 
was suggested that the monetary policy should be made more explicit (inflation targeting) and show 
commitment (transparency and accountability) towards price stability. Their argument was that this 
mechanism would work as a partial substitute of monetary independence and coordination from the 
fiscal authority. However, their arguments require empirical validations as absence of coordination 
could bring sub-optimal results as acknowledged in a previous section. In the context of allocating 
leadership to a policy, analysing macroeconomic policy interaction in the EMU under three scenarios 
(Fiscal Lead, Monetary Lead and simultaneous policy formation), the study by Hallett (2008) con-
cluded that the fiscal leadership along with instrument independence and central bank independ-
ence results in a better outcome for output, inflation and fiscal balances. Furthermore, it provides 
fiscal stability without engaging into fiscal rules. The results were robust against fiscal override, 
market reforms, globalization and changes in savings. However, it was cautioned that in case mon-
etary authority gets leadership, target and instrument setting could cause adverse effects. Their 
suggestion to allocate leadership to fiscal policy supported its role even for price stability, a basic 
objective of monetary policy.
As briefly discussed earlier, a prominent limitation of monetary policy is the zero-bond or so-called 
liquidity trap. In practice, the BoE has set interest rates at an all time low (0.5%) since March 2009, 
which is almost zero-bonds. This limitation of monetary policy in the light of macroeconomic policy 
interaction was investigated by Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2009). They showed that a target (inflation 
or output) for one policy-maker that ignores the incentives and constraints faced by the other policy-
makers can lead to extremely poor outcomes. They argue that the fiscal policy expansion is fruitful 
in the liquidity trap when an independent central bank is not very effective. They also urged to avoid 
giving monetary and fiscal authorities high targets and suggested some dependence on costly fiscal 
policy in a liquidity trap. However, their arguments were based on a theoretical model without sub-
stantial empirical support.
7.5. Monetary coordination for fiscal objectives
Fiscal policy is often the mandate of a political administration which also has responsibility of eco-
nomic growth, perhaps a superior and politically profitable objective. Analysing the economic and 
political aspects of macroeconomic policy interaction, Nordhaus (1994) argued that the deficit 
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reduction can result in an electoral cycle (political effects) if monetary policy is non-cooperative and 
monetary authority may not offset the contractionary effects of fiscal policy. It was cautioned that 
the poorly timid deficit reduction can have adverse effects of real economy for a decade or longer; 
this deficit reduction can increase domestic and foreign investments, but if the monetary policy is 
non-cooperative (contractionary), there can be an adverse impact on economy. However, in case of 
monetary cooperation with simultaneous and sufficient monetary expansions (rate cuts), the gains 
are very high.
In a later study, Shively (2004) empirically showed that the monetary and fiscal policies’ shocks 
dominate output fluctuations in the contractionary regime. It was urged that the policy-makers 
should focus on macroeconomic policy which minimizes the fluctuation of economy as well as poli-
cies which maximize the level of aggregate supply. Their findings supported the Keynesian view of 
stimulating aggregate demand by fiscal policy. Interestingly, they urged monetary policy coopera-
tion for this purpose. Analogously, analysing effects of fiscal policy on output growth in the US econ-
omy, Zubairy (2009) showed the fiscal policy (Spending) effects economic growth. Most importantly, 
it was showed that the strong action of monetary policy can restrain the effects of fiscal policy. 
Therefore, these findings have important implications for simulation of economy and the financial 
sector by fiscal expansions and influence of monetary on their association.
The scope of monetary policy in fiscal efforts to stabilize economy was brought into analysis by 
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006). Focusing on EU, they found that if the monetary authority does not 
adopt active inflation-targeting policy, it helps the fiscal authority to stabilize government debt and 
has a strong impact on output and inflation. Otherwise, conflicting policies can cause macroeco-
nomic instability. They further emphasized that restriction on fiscal policy requires supporting active 
monetary policy. In EU if a fiscal authority cannot meet fiscal requirements, monetary authority has 
to adopt a passive stance to stabilize debt equilibrium by reducing debt cost. Seeing this comple-
mentarity of monetary policy for fiscal policy in the context of fiscal measures in post-financial crises 
(2008–09), Midthjell (2011) argued that the outcome of fiscal measures is not certain as it depends 
on choice of instruments and monetary stance. Moreover, there is limited space for fiscal policy to 
manoeuver due to the limits of public debt and deficit. On the same dimensions, investigating design 
of optimal monetary and fiscal stabilization policies, Ferrero (2009) showed that the optimal mone-
tary policy takes the form of a flexible inflation targeting, while the optimal fiscal rule prevents na-
tional governments from creating inflationary expectations at the union level. Strict inflation 
targeting by the monetary authority in a currency union level and fiscal flexibility were recommend-
ed, as flexible debt targeting improves welfare. Although findings and recommendations may vary 
from a non-monetary union country like Britain with particularly economic environment, most im-
portantly, fiscal flexibility may lead to excessive sovereign debt issues, e.g. Greek and Ireland cases 
as mentioned earlier.
The role of monetary and fiscal policies in the light of Consensus Assignment (monetary policy 
look after inflation and output, while fiscal does debt stabilization) was analysed by Kirsanova, Leith, 
and Lewis (2010). It was argued that in New Keynesian framework, monetary policy dominates fiscal 
policy for inflation and output stabilization, also in a situation when monetary policy cannot control 
inflation; therefore, it was suggested that this aspect focusing on monetary policy only should not be 
overstated. Moreover, they also supported the role of monetary policy in debt stabilization as it costs 
less than in the general perception and is effective in swift stabilization. Hence, fiscal policy does not 
dominate in debt stabilization. Though their analysis lacked empirical support, however, based on 
theoretical model, their augments established the importance of monetary policy in a fiscal role.
In the context of this study, the prime focus is on the financial sector rather than real economy, 
although the financial sector’s stability is not a formal objective of fiscal authority; the unconven-
tional steps (bailouts) taken by various fiscal authorities mentioned earlier could associate financial 
stability as an implicit object of fiscal authority.
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7.6. Macroeconomic policy formulation: discretion vs. commitment
Policy formulation can be either by discretion of policy-makers or by following predetermined policy 
rules. There are mix arguments on the choice of discretion or commitment. In the critical analysis of 
the US macroeconomic policy, Tager and Van Lear (2001) urged that the fiscal and monetary poli-
cies’ rules may not be as successful as there can be the problem of rigidity with policy rules. Policy 
rules do not help the people and organization left behind the market. There was no analytical model 
or data used in their research; therefore, their arguments were not supported by empirical evidenc-
es. More recent analysis by Adam and Billi (2011) showed that the discretionary macroeconomic 
policies cause high economic volatility and fiscal imbalance. To deal with this situation, they sug-
gested a conservative monetary authority completely focused on inflation and determined after 
fiscal policy. However, if monetary policy is formulated before fiscal policy or simultaneously, it loses 
optimality, even in the case when fiscal policy overlooks its impact on a monetary policy role. 
Nevertheless, their assertion on non-cooperating monetary policy rules raises concerns about the 
adverse outcome in case of policy conflict as mentioned earlier.
Contrarily, we can also acknowledge some evidence in favour of commitment of macroeconomic 
policies; for instance, a study by Pappa and Vassilatos (2007) claimed that in a monetary union, 
constrained fiscal policy with clear rules and active monetary policy for inflation control is necessary 
for macroeconomic stability. Strict fiscal rules are effective in price stability and are also not that 
much unbearable as they have been thought. However, their arguments were opposing to the idea 
that the aggressive policy actions could hamper economic and financial stabilities.
7.7. Popularity of policy interaction in euro zone
Most of the study considering policy interaction had been focused on EMU; hence, Semmler and 
Zhang (2003) associated a whole aspect of literature on policy interaction to the Euro Zone. 
Prominent studies on the Euro zone, for instance Lombardo and Sutherland (2004), Beetsma and 
Jensen (2005), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) and Ferré (2008), have urged for coordination between 
macroeconomic policies as it positively affects real economy. They also cautioned that the conflict-
ing policies can cause economic instability. Interestingly, the analysis by Muscatelli, Tirelli, and 
Trecroci (2004) declared that the interaction depends on the nature of the shocks hitting the econ-
omy, for the cases of output shocks, fiscal and monetary policies tend to act in harmony, whereas 
they are used as substitutes following inflation shocks. They also urged that the fiscal–monetary 
interaction depends on the model used to fit the data. The strategy of employing different methodo-
logical frameworks in this study (DSGE and Econometrics) will further elaborate any dependence of 
fiscal–monetary interaction on empirical framework.
As in the Euro Zone, macroeconomic policies are formulated at union (monetary) as well as na-
tional (fiscal) levels. The policy formulation at different levels has created a situation where there 
might be chances of conflicting policies. A study on conflict of monetary and fiscal policies in cur-
rency union by Sanchez (2010) showed that in a currency union due to the free ride of fiscal policies 
on monetary authority a high volatility in Money markets occurs (interest rates). Therefore, it was 
suggested that small countries should maintain their monetary sovereignty. Although they did not 
provide empirical support to their theoretical inferences, yet recent Euro crises is a clear evidence on 
this issue. Moreover, their arguments were supported by a study analysing the strategic interaction 
between monetary and fiscal policies in a currency union carried out by Grimm and Ried (2007). They 
found that in a currency union where monetary policy is formulated union wide, fiscal policy is for-
mulated strategically at country level (heterogeneously) for national objectives. The best outcome 
is, in the case, when monetary and fiscal policies are agreed on optimal output and inflation level, 
however, they declared it unrealistic. Therefore, the preferences may not coincide leading to worst 
effects. It was suggested that the monetary authority should be given a lead role. They urged to 
reduce heterogeneity of fiscal policies for long-term economic stability in EMU. A later study on the 
same issue of country size asymmetries by Machado and Ribeiro (2010) showed that in a non-coop-
erative scenario, small countries lead to active fiscal policy, while large countries adopt a moderate 
fiscal stance. Furthermore, non-cooperation leads to improved (reduced) outcome for small (large) 
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economies. However, they also supported the policy cooperation as it leads to overall better out-
come on union level.
Heterogeneity of agents (fiscal authorities) in EMU has also created a complex situation for mac-
roeconomic policy responses to a shock; it would be interesting to briefly acknowledge a study by 
Aarle, Garretsen, and Huart (2003) as they analysed monetary and fiscal policies’ interaction in the 
light of spill-over effects between Euro area and non-Euro area economies. It was shown that the 
exchange rates’ adjustment acts as an important stabilizer in the case of external shock to the Euro 
zone. However, in the case of internal and asymmetric shocks, it is not the case. They associated this 
feature with the common monetary policy by ECB. Moreover, they also acknowledged that in the 
case of symmetric shock and symmetric economic structure, it is easier to implement appropriate 
monetary policy than in case with asymmetries. Similarly, the heterogeneity in EU and its implica-
tions for policy interaction were investigated by Asensio (2007) using a Keynesian framework. It 
showed that the heterogeneity has important implications for policy interaction in monetary union. 
Contrary to symmetric, monetary–fiscal instruments respond to almost every shock in a heterogene-
ous environment. The interaction could result in inefficiencies, for instance, unemployment and in-
flation. It was suggested that monetary policy should focus on common effects of shocks, while 
fiscal authorities should focus on idiosyncratic shocks. They associated it with a subsidiary principle 
of macroeconomic policy in the Euro zone.
Particularly, in a scenario when substantial aspect of research on interaction is only focused on 
Euro zone (Semmler & Zhang, 2003) where monetary policy is formulated by the European Central 
Bank (ECB) at union level but fiscal policies are formulated at country level, it may not be appropriate 
to generalize the policy recommendation to an economy with monetary sovereignty. Perhaps, the 
role of macroeconomic policies and their interrelation in the EU has its own idiosyncratic nature and 
may not be appropriate to be generalized for economy like the British. In this context, on the basis 
of comprehensive study, Viegi (1999) concluded that in a monetary union, the default risk can be 
used as a tool to gain bail out, particularly by large countries, although this privilege may not be 
available to non-union members. It was also cautioned that ignoring the long-term consequences 
of fiscal indiscipline could cause high debt and inflation issues; therefore, sound fiscal policies should 
be adopted. Moreover, in a monetary union, fiscal policy has spill-over effects and it was cautioned 
that it could lead to high inflationary stance by all fiscal members. Although the independence of 
central bank was appreciated, however, its possible conflict with fiscal policy was considered coun-
terproductive. The independence of central bank leads to active use of fiscal policy by the govern-
ment as price becomes a less important objective and associated with monetary authority. Obviously, 
this could not be the case in the UK where fiscal authorities would have some concern about infla-
tion due to country-wide scope.
7.8. Macroeconomic policy interaction and crowding out
Although the crowding out aspect of fiscal policy in stock and bond markets could not be evident, a 
study by Stemp (2001) on investigating Australian foreign exchange markets concluded that fiscal 
policy can affect the exchange rate temporarily as an expansionary fiscal policy is crowded out by 
exchange rate appreciation, while contractionary policy is crowded out by exchange rate deprecia-
tion. There were no empirical methods used; critical analysis was based on arguments stemming 
from theories and current economic situation. The important point here is if we add exchange rate 
crowding out to consumption and investment crowding out (mentioned earlier), are there some 
crowding out effects of fiscal policy on bond and stock markets? If so, how does interaction with 
monetary policy influence fiscal policy and the financial sector relationship? In this regard, the study 
on foreign exchange markets and macroeconomic policies by Cook and Devereux (2006) supported 
flexible exchange rate as it can increase performance of fiscal policy and capital inflow and also 
emphasized on coordination between fiscal and monetary policies.
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7.9. Favouring non-coordination
Apart from frequent evidences in favour of macroeconomic coordination cited in previous para-
graphs, there are also some studies, for instance Adam and Billi (2011), which argued that the fiscal 
policy could adopt a non-cooperative stance. Therefore, a conservative monetary authority should 
completely focus on its mandate of price stability and determine its stance after fiscal policy. 
Nevertheless, on this aspect, analysing interaction between monetary and fiscal policies in the EMU, 
a comparatively comprehensive theoretical framework (without empirical validation) by Staudinger 
(2003) showed that the monetary authority (ECB) is always better off if it takes a leading role 
(Stackelberg leader); however, for fiscal policy, it depends on the weights given to the inflation and 
output, which was non-cooperative (Nash) in most of the scenarios considered. Similarly, analysing 
the roles of optimal fiscal and monetary policies in economic stabilization, Beetsma and Jensen 
(2005) claimed that if the price rigidities between countries in a monetary union become equal, the 
stabilization is only done by monetary policy without requiring effort from fiscal policy. On the other 
hand, we must remember that a non-coordination scenario was discouraged in the same framework 
(Game Theory), prominently by Leitemo (2004) and Chadha and Nolan (2007) as they cautioned that 
the Nash game between monetary and fiscal authorities could be harmful to economy; therefore, 
fiscal policy should support the monetary policy objective.
Some support to independent macroeconomic policy formulation was given by Leciejewicz (2010) 
while analysing the need for macroeconomic coordination vs. independence in the light of theoreti-
cal framework (Game Theory). It was shown that there is also a possibility of a different situation, 
where the independent decision between monetary and fiscal authorities may not lead to an ad-
verse (Pareto non-optimal) scenario. However, it was also stated that the choice of instrument and 
policy mix depends on the effectiveness of that policy or instrument and background economic 
scenario. Most importantly, the idea of coordination could not be fully rejected in this study, as it was 
also acknowledged that for higher output growth, expansionary monetary policy should be coupled 
with tight fiscal stance.
Instead of monetary–fiscal coordination, a comparative analysis between monetary–fiscal and 
fiscal–fiscal policies’ coordination in EMU was made by Carlberg (2004). It was argued that the coop-
eration between fiscal authorities (German and French) and monetary authorities leads to full em-
ployment. The monetary independence and cooperation between fiscal authorities also leads to full 
employment; therefore, it was urged that the cooperation is not compulsory as the required output 
could also achieved without cooperation. Although their assertions lacked empirical support, in a 
non-union country, for instance UK, there is only one fiscal authority; thus, we cannot go far on this 
dimension.
Analysing the implications of macroeconomic policy coordination in the long and short terms in 
EMU, Hagen and Mundschenk (2002) argued that in the long run, the price stability can be achieved 
without coordination as tight fiscal policy in future would offset the expansionary (inflationary) 
stance of the present fiscal policy. However, this argument raises a few doubts as what if an auto-
matic stabilizer would not work in the long term? Future taxes could not balance the books and what 
if inflation could not be stabilized? Nevertheless, they implicitly answered these concerns by ac-
knowledging the need for coordination in the short term as lack of it could lead to adverse economic 
conditions. Therefore, it needs to have consensus on aggregate output and price level in EMU be-
tween monetary and fiscal authorities. They also declared current level and arrangements of policy 
coordination insufficient.
An important implication of FTPL is that the “Inflation is also a Fiscal phenomena”. The validity of 
FTPL and monetarist doctrine was carried out by McCallum and Nelson (2006). They showed that 
both interest rates’ rules and money stock rules share the opinion that the inflation is also a function 
of fiscal policy. However, they suggested that detailed coordination between macroeconomic poli-
cies is not needed as monetary authority can achieve price stability at its own. Nevertheless, their 
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unwarranted assertion raises a major concern that if fiscal policy also has a permanent impact on 
economy, how could monetary policy achieve its objectives on its own in case of a policy conflict?
A study in this context was performed by Buti, Roeger, and Veld (2001); their theoretical analysis 
and numerical simulation showed that the complementarity (coordination) and substitutability of 
macroeconomic policies and their preferences with respect to each other depend on shock hitting 
the economy. In the case of supply shocks, they move in opposite ways, while in demand shock, they 
move in same direction; although their comprehensive analysis favoured coordination to some ex-
tent, yet they associated coordination as dependent on shock hitting the economy which implies 
that the coordination is vulnerable to the exogenous factors.
Regarding the issue to coordinate or not to coordinate, Niemann and Hagen’s (2008) argument is 
that the independent monetary authorities are reluctant to coordinate with fiscal authorities. To 
support their point of view, they gave the reference of European Central Bank’s (ECB) first President 
Duisenberg (2003); there is clearly no scope for coordination between monetary and fiscal policies, 
If that is really the case, the practises by the monetary authorities are not in line with the research-
ers. Nevertheless, supportive arguments on non-coordination were given by Nyamonga, Sichei, and 
Mutai (2008) while analysing the behaviour of macroeconomic policies in Kenya. It was reported 
that during the time horizon of study, the monetary and fiscal policies have shown coordination in a 
few periods while some periods lacked coordination. They found evidence of monetary policy domi-
nance and declared it as a cause of less harmful outcome during times of non-cooperation. On the 
other hand, a study on providing evidence on practises of macroeconomic policy coordination in the 
USA, Astudillo showed that most of the time policies were complementary to each other for stability. 
We would see this phenomenon in the context of UK economy in the next section.
They majority of studies on economic policy interaction have urged for coordination between poli-
cies. Followed by many others, a landmark study was by Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003) which 
gave the thought of “Symbiosis”; how to coincide for the financial sector’s stability is still an un-an-
swered question. Moreover, when we compare the empirical work on macroeconomic policy coordi-
nation, there are differences of opinion. von Thadden (2004), Schabert (2006) and Ferrero (2009) 
urged to avoid very strict monetary policy for inflation control and emphasized on fiscal discipline. 
Similarly, passive monetary and expansionary fiscal policy was suggested by Traum and Yang (2011) 
for increased output. Contrarily, Barnett (2005), Pappa and Vassilatos (2007) and very recently Davig, 
Leeper, and Walker (2011) urged for constrained fiscal policy but strict monetary policy for the same 
objectives. Focusing on real economy (inflation and output), these studies have conflicting conclu-
sions. Obviously, in the light of these contradictory arguments, we cannot suggest a solution for the 
financial sector of a particular economy unless a comprehensive empirical analysis is performed.
7.10. Interaction and institutional arrangements
The significance of intuitional arrangements for an individual policy role has been acknowledged 
earlier; however, its implications in addition to macroeconomic events could affect the way macro-
economic policy interacts. In this context, analysing macroeconomic policy interaction in Indonesia, 
Mochtar (2004) found that the Asian Financial Crises (1997) lead central bank to run Quasi Fiscal 
Activity (QFA). They also briefly looked into the central bank independence and urged that the cen-
tral bank has given independence in Indonesia, yet it demands fiscal discipline in controlling infla-
tion. They cautioned that the fiscal indiscipline could put the inflation-targeting effort by monetary 
authority in vein. Moreover, it causes tight monetary policy which leads to further appreciation of 
exchange rates and results in further inflation. Therefore, they urged on fiscal policy cooperation in 
inflation control, despite monetary independence. However, briefly acknowledging the role of intui-
tional arrangements in macroeconomic policy interaction, Javed and Sahinoz (2005) argued that the 
fiscal authorities have conflicting incentives, targets and objectives. Therefore, they urged allocation 
of intuitional arrangement to monetary policy with regard to fiscal stance. Nevertheless, they also 
agreed on the idea of coordination for external and internal balances in economy.
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There are conflicting opinions on independence of monetary authority; analysing the policy inter-
action in Russia, Merzlyakov (2011) argued that the independence of a central bank does not consid-
erably influence policy impact. The macroeconomic policy interaction was most influential under 
fiscal policy as Stackelberg and cooperation and Cournot interaction (complete non-coordination) 
lead to adverse economic outcome. Contrarily, a similar study with an advantage of empirical sup-
port on the effects of setting an inflation target for monetary policy on performance of macroeco-
nomic policies by Franta, Libich, and Stehlik (2011) showed that the fiscal indiscipline could affect 
monetary policy role; however, a legislative inflation target could help monetary policy control ex-
cessive fiscal spending. Moreover, the explicit inflation targeting could also lead to fiscal discipline.
Analysing the macroeconomic policy interaction under various exchange rates’ regime, Claeys 
(2004) showed that the expansionary fiscal policies for output growth cause monetary policy to 
adopt a tighter stance, particularly in countries with a flexible exchange rate. However, in countries 
with fixed exchange rates, the results were not significant. It was also emphasized that the shifts in 
exchange rate policy regime are important. A similar and more recent study on macroeconomic 
policy exchange rates and implication of monetary independence was carried out by Park (2008). 
Interestingly, it was argued that often the exchange rate policy was not affected by monetary and 
fiscal policies; the central bank degree of independence does not affect price level. In specific to the 
UK economy, there have been prominent changes in exchange rate mechanism, for instance, aban-
doning the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1992 which may have important implications for 
policy coordination and interaction.
The importance of institutional design and arrangement in the light of various studies has also 
been acknowledged in literature review chapters; however, we would very briefly revisit a few evi-
dences to refresh the memory of the reader and to establish its relevance with subject study. The 
addition of institutional arrangements aspects is motivated by the arguments by Srinivasan, Jain, 
and Ramachandran (2009), that the institutions must be designed so that the central bank’s com-
mitment to its objectives is not in doubt. In this context, the financial stability has not been a prime 
objective of any central bank, at least not explicitly, to the best of our knowledge; however, if intui-
tional design affects the outcome of macroeconomic policy, it raises the question about its implica-
tions for the financial sector.
One of the major institutional arrangement been made during the time of study was independ-
ence of the Bank of England. This may sound a simple case of giving autonomy to monetary author-
ity to achieve its prime objective for price stability; perhaps, it was the explicit good intention. 
Nevertheless, it was rather a more complex and vital change in the functioning of the BoE. Specifically, 
subject decision resulted in a big shift in intuitional design and certain responsibilities related with 
financial stability, e.g. banking sector supervision and management of sovereign debt were trans-
ferred to Financial Serves Authority (FSA) and DMO. The most significant are: a) the supervision of 
banking sector which was transferred to Financial Services Authority (FSA) and b) the responsibility of 
sovereign debt stabilization which was transferred to Debt Management Office (DMO). These are the 
major shifts in responsibilities and authorities with an intention to increase the efficiency of policy 
formulation; however, these changes may have important implications for the financial sector. 
Perhaps the recent or post-financial crises development and revival of the BoE role in financial stabil-
ity is something that requires plentiful attention. The Financial Services Act (2012) leads to major 
reform in the form of formulation of FPC. The prime objective of the Committee is to identify, monitor 
and take action to reduce systemic risk for the protection and resilience of the British financial sec-
tor. In addition to that the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) as a part of the BoE also started to 
function from April 2013 with the objection of banking sector supervision. In specific to effectiveness 
of macroeconomic policies and financial stability, these intuitional changes raise questions whether 
the withdrawal of earlier cited responsibilities of financial supervision from the BoE influenced mac-
roeconomic policy role.
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In this context, a study by Weymark (2007) declared that a fully independent central bank is only 
concerned with achievement of economic objectives, whereas fiscal authority may influence mon-
etary framework. However, we need to validate these assertions and extend them to the financial 
sector. We can report some evidence on this aspect in a US case; Lobo (2000) concluded that the 
Federal Reserve policy of immediate disclosure has resulted in change of volatility of stock market 
from before to after the announcement of monetary policy decisions. Later investigation by Lobo, 
Darrat, and Ramchander (2006) also acknowledged that the Federal Reserve disclosure policy has 
influenced the impact of monetary policy on foreign exchange markets. However, we need to see it 
in the context of Optimal Policy Combination as well as both financial market (stock and bond). In 
specific to our case, Bank of England has been independent since 1997 which may have important 
implications for macroeconomic policy interaction and the financial sector. With regard to the mac-
roeconomic policy interaction and real economy, we can associate the remarks by Dixit and 
Lambertini (2001) as they argued that in the case of disagreement, the outcome can be influenced 
by institution design.
Despite the fact that we could not evidence, many studies on policy coordination in the light of 
institutional design, yet there is a work done by Arby and Hanif (2010). It was showed that the mon-
etary policy stance has shown a poor coordination with fiscal policy in Pakistan. The institutional 
arrangements, i.e. establishment of Monetary and Fiscal Policies Coordination Board, could not con-
tribute towards coordination. This finding would be interesting in the UK context as MPC of the BoE 
responsible for formulation of monetary policy has representation of Fiscal authority (HM Treasury); 
our empirical findings in this study would give us further insight if this arrangement has been suc-
cessful for policy coordination.
In addition to the independence of the BoE, a major change in the institutional framework of the 
BoE was an explicit target of price stability by keeping inflation to 2% of Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
or Target 2.0. On this aspect, Haldane and Read (2000) investigated the role of monetary policy un-
der the influence of inflation targeting and its effects on bond market (yield curve). They found that 
introduction of inflation targeting in UK has significantly decreased the effects of monetary policy 
surprises on yield curve. They associated it with the increased transparency of monetary policy due 
to inflation targeting. Yet, we are seeing this shift in association with addition of interaction with 
fiscal policy stock market.
If we review the literature on the performance of policy framework, institutional design of mone-
tary policy in the UK was praised by Bhundia and Donnell (2002), arguing that independence of 
central bank and institutional arrangements is based on the principles of credibility, flexibility and 
democratic legitimacy. Therefore, the independence of the BoE has not only increased the effective-
ness of monetary policy, it has increased the fiscal coordination. Their arguments were logical, but 
there was no empirical evidence. In addition, this assertion also requires validity for the financial 
sector and most importantly its combination with fiscal policy.
More recently, analysing institutional changes, Osborn and Sensier (2009) found that there was a 
strong evidence of structural break coinciding with the introduction of inflation targeting. They de-
clared the inflation targeting as more important change than the independence of BoE. Similarly, 
Lildholdt and Wetherilt (2004) concluded that the ability of market participants to predict monetary 
policy stance by BoE has been improved. Later, analysing economic and structural changes in the UK 
economy (output, inflation and Forex), under different monetary regimes, Baumeister, Liu, and 
Mumtaz (2010) found that there had been a shift in response of monetary policy from economic 
growth and exchange rates’ fluctuation to inflation at present. They also acknowledged that eco-
nomic fluctuation was less frequent after 1992 until recent past, though they did not associate it 
with any institutional aspect. The subject study urges to see their assertions in the light of compre-
hensive and alternative empirical frameworks and its implications for the financial sector.
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7.11. Tinbergen principle not asserting a solution
An important aspect in policy interaction of combination is the Tinbergen Principle, according to 
which there should be equal numbers of instruments and targets. Therefore, one could argue that 
the idea of policy combination is based on Tinbergen thoughts. In this context, there are very inter-
esting arguments by Hughes Hallett et al. (2011). They argued that “Let us note that there will be no 
additional policy instrument to achieve the financial stability goal (in the spirit of Tinbergen, 
1952). Nevertheless, they also urged on the joint use of policies to achieve optimal results and 
warned that it is never socially optimal for monetary policy to do the job on its own.” Furthermore, 
the ability of macroeconomic policies to stabilize the household and public debt depends on features 
of economy and preferences of monetary and fiscal policies about output and inflation. In some 
cases, both policies could be used while in some situations, one single policy is beneficial. It was also 
warned that the both policies could have a moral hazard of being not very active and passing the 
responsibility to other for which they used to term “Passing the Buck”. Similarly, discoursing the 
generalization of the Tinbergen Principle, Agenor and Silva (2012, p. 6) argued that the “Tinbergen’s 
principle is concerned with the existence and location of a solution to the system; it does not assert 
that any given set of policy responses will, in fact, lead to that solution. To assert this, it is necessary 
to investigate the stability properties of a dynamic system.” In simple words, one policy combination 
does not fit all and Tinbergen does not suggest any policy combination either. Most importantly, it is 
not only the number of instruments, as some policy instruments might be more effective than others 
in particular scenarios (state dependency).
7.12. Interaction and the financial sector (stock and bond markets)
Studies on macroeconomic policy interaction acknowledged in the above lines have been only fo-
cused on real economy (inflation and output) and none of them brought the financial sector (stock 
and bond markets) into consideration, despite its accepted importance. The very first and probably 
only study which jointly considered fiscal and monetary policies in the financial sector analysis was 
carried out by Jansen et al. (2008). Though they did not suggest any optimal combination of policies, 
they reported that the relationship between monetary policy and the US stock market could be in-
fluenced by fiscal policy. They showed that the impact of monetary policy on the asset markets var-
ies with the state of fiscal deficits or surpluses. Their empirical results were consistent with the 
notion of strong interdependence between monetary and fiscal policies. Perhaps, they also declared 
it as the first effort in this dimension, but with limited empirical framework (semi-parametric regres-
sion); policy interaction or combination was not considered thoroughly and the study was only fo-
cused on analysing the impact of monetary policy on the financial market under fiscal policy 
influence. Semi-parametric regression contains assumptions which could lead to inconsistency and 
misspecification. Equally focusing on both monetary and fiscal policies, this study offers DSGE and 
VAR models which are very comprehensive frameworks. Most importantly, this study aims to find 
optimal policy combination for financial stability (stock and bond markets) in the light of state de-
pendency. Perhaps, the US stock markets have certain characteristic which make them different 
from the UK as identified by Yang et al. (2009), i.e. risk and behaviour/pattern of markets. In the next 
section, we would briefly review the financial sector (stock and bond markets) in the UK and evi-
dence the performance of macroeconomic policies.
8. Conclusions
The macroeconomic policy is a vast subject and an important aspect of macroeconomics, perhaps 
due to its importance as well as its national and international implications it has been given signifi-
cant attention to. Moreover, a substantial review of macroeconomic policy literature in the above 
lines indicates that the performance of the financial sector has crucial implications for real economy. 
The volatility in financial markets could hamper the economic growth and objective of macroeco-
nomic policy-makers. It has also been acknowledged that the macroeconomic policies could influ-
ence the financial sector. Hence, due to the importance of financial stability for the real economy 
and effectiveness of macroeconomic policies for the financial sector, it creates scope of active policy 
responses to the financial sector’s dynamics. Nevertheless, it is also evident that the solo efforts of 
a macroeconomic policy have not been very successful and often bring some adverse side effects. 
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Therefore, it is absolutely vital to consider both monetary and fiscal policies and analyse how their 
combination could positively influence the financial sector.
In addition, there are three more aspects we need to consider. Firstly, we are to consider the intui-
tional changes in macroeconomic policy framework. The existing studies have evidenced significant 
effects and implications of intuitional changes in the role of macroeconomic policies. We need to 
look at this factor in the context of macroeconomic policy interaction and its influence on financial 
markets. Secondly, there is evidence on the shift of monetary policy and financial market relation-
ship after a major macroeconomic event. Therefore, we also need to consider the implications of 
such events on optimality of policy combination for financial stability. Thirdly, studies in the existing 
literature on the subject have either used Econometric or General Equilibrium framework and 
Frequentist or Bayesian approach. However, both frameworks and empirical approaches have their 
own advantages and limitations. Some recent studies have also urged the use of alternative ap-
proaches. Therefore, in specific to the subject, we are incorporating both empirical frameworks and 
approaches for the validation and robustness of our results.
9. Macroeconomic policies’ framework and the financial sector in the UK
Macroeconomic policies in subject economy are formulated by separate institutions at country level; 
this is in contrast to the Euro zone; therefore, we can expect more national interest and perhaps 
country-specific context. In the UK, Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) is responsible for the formulation 
and implementation of fiscal policy, whereas monetary policy is autonomously formulated by the 
BoE since its independence in May 1997. Moreover, the BoE has an explicit price stability objective, 
i.e. 2% rate of inflation (consumer price index), which is targeted by interest rate instrument. The 
decisions on monetary policy are made by the MPC on monthly bases. In case the inflation target is 
missed by 1% below or above the target rate, the Governor of the BoE has to write a letter to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to explain the causes. The MPC consists of nine members including five 
members from the BoE and four external members selected by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Before we go towards macroeconomic policy interaction, it is worth mentioning here that the 
performance of macroeconomic policy framework in subject economy is controversial as Haldane 
(1997), Bakhshi, Haldane, and Hatch (1997) and Osborn and Sensier (2009) appreciated its role, 
whereas Henry (2001) hugely criticized the performance of macroeconomic policies. In a later study, 
Lee (2009) also joined the criticism arguing that the fiscal policy rules13 were violated and monetary 
policy effectiveness was undermined by financial market volatility and economic instability. Though 
arguments by the latter lack empirical evidence, this study would view them in the light of compre-
hensive empirical framework, the financial sector’s performance and scope for policies interaction in 
this context.
Among prominent critics of monetary and fiscal policies’ performance in the UK, Henry (2001) ar-
gued that the present framework of macroeconomic policies does not work well in the case of ad-
verse shocks to the economy. Fiscal policy had been loosed which has caused the monetary policy 
to adopt a tight stance to control inflation. Policy framework has caused the appreciation in ex-
change rates which have resulted in worsening of current account balance. Furthermore, the stabil-
ity of inflation was associated with international outlook and if the world inflation gets worse, the UK 
would be strongly affected. It was also suggested that there is need of a council of economic advi-
sors which can analyse the fiscal stance and publish its appraisals. Though the conclusion was not 
supported by empirical evidences, arguments were quite logical. Analogously, later study by Angeriz 
and Arestis (2007) criticized tight monetary policy; they concluded that inflation targeting has been 
successful in the context of HM treasury target level and inflation had been “locked in”. Yet, the infla-
tion had also been low in a non-inflation targeting country like the USA. Furthermore, they also de-
clared globalization as a cause of low inflation, instead of monetary policy success.
Macroeconomic policies also have political implications in this context; Lee (2009) criticizing the 
government argued that the UK economy had started moving towards recession before the financial 
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crises. Moreover, the claim of monetary policy effectiveness was undermined by the financial market 
and economic volatility. Although the arguments made by Lee (2009) lacked empirical support, the 
behaviour of financial markets depicted in Figure 3 provides support to these arguments. The London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) showed frequent hideous episodes of sharp decline from the last quarter of 
2008 till the first quarter 2009.
The Green line represents Quarterly, Blue line represents the daily, while Red line represents 
monthly averages of FTSE-100 index. It took market several quarters with very volatile behaviour to 
return close to the pre-crises level. As seen in Figure 5, the stock market started slow recovery at the 
end of the first quarter in 2009, almost the same time when the BoE carried out Quantitative Easing 
(QE) and Asset purchases.
Nevertheless, the bond market has also responded to the financial crises and macroeconomic 
policy responses as we can evidence in Figure 6.
There is negative yield on 10-year Gilts, a clear representation of expansionary monetary policy 
and Quantitative Easing (QE) which have suppressed the yield on gilts. It implies that although the 
government could borrow at negative real interest rates, saving household would get negative real 
returns.
Coming back towards the theoretical arguments, Lee (2009) declared that the British model of 
competitive policy failed as fiscal policy’s Golden rule (borrow to invest public investment not con-
sumption) and sustainable investment rule (Debt-to-GDP 40%) were violated. Importantly, the 
Figure 5. FTSE 100 (July 2007 to 
July 2012).
Note: 90 Days Moving Avg 
(green line), 30 Days Moving 
Avg (red line), and Daily Avg 
(blue line). 
Source: London Stock 
Exchange.
Figure 6. Real yield on 10-year 
Gilts, January 2000–February 
2013.
Source: Bank of England 
(2012).
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crucial aspect was risk-based financial regulation which caused the economy to be badly hurt during 
financial crises, although the blame had been put on the American subprime mortgage market for a 
year. Similarly, a study on stabilization of business cycle volatility as a key motive of economic poli-
cies in the UK, Atanasova and Gang (2008) declared that there was no significant evidence on de-
clined business cycle volatility. Arguments by Lee (2009) lacked empirical support as no statistical 
method was used; however, the aforementioned outlook of the financial sector and below-cited 
fiscal situation prominent in Figure 7 support their arguments.
This study aims to provide empirical evidence to argument and make concluding remarks without 
any political context. In the next few sections, we will review some studies on the role of macroeco-
nomic policies and their interaction.
10. Monetary policy role
The role of monetary policy has been very significant for the UK economy; in this context, a study by 
Beladi and Samanta (1988) is worth mentioning. They analysed the relation between money growth 
and output growth in the light of Rational Expectation Structural Neutrality (RESN) hypothesis, which 
emphasizes that the only unanticipated money growth affects economic activity. Interestingly, em-
pirical findings did not support RESN hypothesis which has the implication that monetary policy ef-
fective in the UK, whether it is anticipated or unanticipated by market participants.
In practice, the response of stock and bond markets to monetary policy in the UK is acknowledged 
by the Bank of England (2011), stating that the bonds and equities are inversely related to monetary 
policy (interest rates) due to the high rates on which future income is discounted. In the macroeco-
nomic policy literature, Bredin el al. (2005) showed that the contractionary monetary policy leads to 
a negative response in various sectors of the stock market. More recently, Gregoriou, Kontonikas, 
MacDonald, and Montagnoli (2009) also showed that stock market response to contractionary mon-
etary policies is negative, which has become positive during the credit crisis. “They associated it with 
limitation of monetary policy, i.e. further rate cuts; this situation provides rationale to bring in fiscal 
policy which is the premise of this study.”
In the light of the literature reviewed so far, it has been observed that there has not been substan-
tial research performed on the interaction of economic policies, in particular to UK’s economic and 
financial environments. Yet, there are a few studies which we could acknowledge. Interesting, in the 
context of financial sector, Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2006) urged that due to wealth effects and 
inefficiency of markets, responses of asset prices should be incorporated in monetary policy formu-
lation. However, it is not part of practise so far. In addition, Allen and Yang (2004) found that apart 
from the dividend growth and monetary policy, the stock prices are also affected by un-explained 
Figure 7. UK sovereign debt in 
comparison with income.
Source: Office of National 
Statistics (2012).
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innovation. There was no further investigation to analyse the unexplained innovation which might 
be due to several factors including fiscal policy.
11. Fiscal policy role
In specific to subject economy, the role of contractionary fiscal policy was investigated by Barrell and 
Riley (2004). Their simulation and empirical analysis showed that the economy seems imbalanced; 
however, a fiscal contraction (spending) without increase in taxes would affect exchange rate (de-
preciation) markets and money markets (lower interest rates). In contrast, if there had been fiscal 
expansion (spending) accompanied by the increases in taxes, the effectiveness of fiscal policy de-
creases. Their analysis prominently supported the limited role of fiscal policy; however, it was con-
trary to Keynesian philosophy of active fiscal responses when the economy is in recession and 
financial volatility. Earlier to them, a similar study by Alec Chrystal and Dowd (1989) performed in 
the light of various economic schools of thoughts showed that contrary to Keynesian ideology, the 
fiscal expansion had negative impacts on economy output. Their results support the Real Business 
Cycle theory. On the other hand, a quite interesting and recent study by Creel, Monperrus-Veroni, 
and Saraceno (2009) found that the New Classical Macroeconomic framework which opposes the 
Keynesian idea of active fiscal policy has illuminated the importance of fiscal policy. They argued 
that the fiscal policy may dominate the monetary policy without having any negative influence on 
economic stability. Moreover, the effectiveness of Fiscal policy (Keynesian Multiplier) has been in-
creased over time in France and the UK. They also considered it disappointing that even the ac-
cepted importance of fiscal policy central bank dominance, rules and fiscal constraints has not 
changed. Their arguments received further support by an investigation made by Malley, 
Philippopoulos, and Woitek (2009), who showed that the dependence of counter cyclical fiscal policy 
on output and debt dynamics causes indeterminacy, whereas under counter cyclical fiscal policy, 
welfare gains were greater. Therefore, they recommended active counter cyclical fiscal policy in 
countries like the UK. Nevertheless, a study by Kirsanova, Stehn, and Vines (2005) concluded that 
best outcome is achieved when both fiscal and monetary policies perform together, which is also the 
theme of this study.
12. Macroeconomic policy interaction in the UK
An extensive review of literature on macroeconomic policies shows that the monetary–fiscal policy 
interaction, even their joint analysis, had not been popular, in particular to the UK economic environ-
ment; perhaps it has been more popular in the EMU. Pointing out this fact, Semmler and Zhang 
(2003) associated a whole aspect of existing macroeconomic policy interaction literature to EMU, 
declaring it crucial for Euro economy.
Among very rare studies from the UK which jointly considered the role of monetary and fiscal poli-
cies, an investigation by Kirsanova et al. (2005) which was limited to a theoretical framework (no 
empirical validation) argued that the best outcome is achieved when macroeconomic policies are 
cooperative and monetary policy perform actively for economic stabilization (inflation, output and 
debt). Results were consistent when fiscal policy performs actively, acknowledging monetary policy 
does not play Nash (non-cooperatively). In their theoretical framework, they only acknowledged 
behaviour of the output and inflation under macroeconomic policy interaction and did not perform 
any empirical analysis. Moreover, the financial sector could not gain any attention. Later study by 
Creel et al. (2009) showed that the fiscal policy may dominate monetary policy without having any 
negative influence on economic stability. Nevertheless, they only focused on the role of fiscal policy 
and little insight was given into the monetary policy behaviour; moreover, no optimal combination 
of policies was suggested either.
The implications for monetary–fiscal interaction for economic stabilization in a rather recent study 
were investigated by Blake and Kirsanova (2011). They showed that in case when there is conserva-
tive monetary authority, the strategic action by fiscal authority could lead to welfare losses; interest-
ingly, they gave a notion that having two policy-makers could lead to conflict and stabilization bias. 
They argued that the strategic behaviour of fiscal authority may have costs which should also be 
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considered. Moreover, the monetary policy should also support if there is high debt. In a non-coop-
erative scenario, the Nash leads to high volatility. The main conclusion of their comprehensive analy-
sis was the coordination between policies. Yet, most importantly, recent study by Fragetta and 
Kirsanova (2010) showed that in the UK, macroeconomic policies act in non-cooperative manner. 
Although they did not mention the cause of non-cooperation and recommendation for cooperation, 
their findings are distressing as the poor financial and economic scenarios could be attributed to 
non-cooperation between macroeconomic policies.
13. Institutional changes in policy framework
An important aspect of this study is the state dependency of optimal policy combination. In this re-
gard, there have been a few remarkable changes in the intuitional arrangements of macroeconomic 
policy framework in the last few decades. Significant among them are withdrawal from Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (1992), independence of the BoE and formulation of MPC (1997), inflation targeting 
(1992 and 2003) and Fiscal Responsibility Act (2010). Although, it would be quite interesting to see 
the implications of all the institutional changes for optimal policy combination, the most important 
and interesting change in the context of this study might be independence of the BoE in 1997. 
Apparently, it is just giving autonomy to monetary authority with the intention that it could focus on 
its prime object of price stability. Nevertheless, there were some vital responsibilities related to fi-
nancial stability, which were transferred from the Bank of England to other institutions. “The most 
important are: (1) the supervision of the banking sector was transferred to Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) and (2) the responsibility to stabilize sovereign was debt transferred to Debt 
Management Office (DMO).” These are major shifts in responsibilities and authorities from the BoE to 
FSA and DMO. Perceptibly, the rationale of these arrangements would be to increase the efficiency 
of policy formulation; however, these changes may have important implications for UK’s financial 
sector and economy as we have provided some evidence on other economics earlier.
Among the studies which analysed the impact of intuitional changes in macroeconomic policy 
framework in the UK, Haldane and Read (2000) investigated the role of monetary policy under the 
influence of inflation targeting and its effects on the bond market (yield curve). They found that in-
troduction of inflation targeting in the UK has significantly decreased the effects of monetary policy 
surprises on yield curve. They associated it with the increased transparency of monetary policy due 
to inflation targeting. Yet, we are seeing this shift in association with the addition of interaction with 
fiscal policy. Institutional design of macroeconomic policy in the UK was praised by Bhundia and 
Donnell (2002) who argued that independence of central bank in the UK and institutional arrange-
ments are based on the principles of credibility, flexibility and democratic legitimacy. Therefore, the 
independence of the BoE has not only increased the effectiveness of monetary policy, it has in-
creased the fiscal coordination. Their arguments were logical but there was no empirical evidence.
Analysing institutional changes, Osborn and Sensier (2009) found that the there was strong evi-
dence of a structural break coinciding with the introduction of inflation targeting. They declared the 
inflation targeting as a more important change than the independence of the BoE. Similarly, Lildholdt 
and Wetherilt (2004) concluded that the ability of market participants to predict monetary policy 
stance by the BoE has been improved. Later, analysing economic and structural changes in the UK 
economy (output, inflation and Forex) under different monetary regimes, Liu and Mumtaz (2010) 
found that there had been a shift in response of monetary policy from economic growth and ex-
change rates (1975s) to inflation at present. They also acknowledged that economic fluctuation was 
less frequent after 1992 until recent past, though they did not associate it with any institutional as-
pect. The subject study would see their assertions in the light of comprehensive and alternative 
empirical frameworks and its implications for the financial sector.
14. Macroeconomic events and shift in policy effectiveness
The second context of state dependency in which we analyse the impact of optimal policy combina-
tion is the major macroeconomic event and resulting shift in policy effects. In specific to subject 
economy and the financial sector, we have three major events in the last two decades which include 
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the Collapse of Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), Dotcom bubble or Stock Exchange Crash of (2002) 
and earlier acknowledged Global Financial Crises and Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy (2008) which 
severely hit global as well as the British stock market. It must be acknowledged here not many stud-
ies have considered the implications of these events on macroeconomic policy role, particularly in 
subject economy. Nevertheless, we have some evidence on this aspect; a study by Gregoriou et al. 
(2009) analysed the influence of stock exchange crash on monetary policy effectiveness. A struc-
tural break was found in between contractionary monetary policy and stock market relationship 
which changed from negative to positive in the post-financial crisis (2008) period. “They associated 
it with limitation of monetary policy, i.e. further rate cuts; this situation provides rationale to bring in 
the fiscal policy which is the premise of this study.” They also declared their study as the first to 
consider the shift in monetary policy and stock relationship in the light of financial crises (2008). 
However, there are two major aspects we must consider: (1) as cited earlier, the monetary policy, 
particularly interest rate instrument in Britain, is in the Liquidity Trap since March 2009; (2) in the 
light of enormous arguments in favour of joint policy analysis, it is vital to consider fiscal policy as 
well. Therefore, in subject study, we are considering both policies and in context of major economic 
events, it would be helpful to understand which policy instrument is more useful and how to opti-
mally combine them for financial stability.
15. Alternative empirical frameworks
Macroeconomic policy literature shows that either GE modelling or Econometrics techniques have 
been used for empirical analysis. Acknowledging this fact, Bhattarai (2011) urged that the DSGE and 
Econometrics should be considered complementary techniques rather than competitive. In 
Econometrics framework, structural parameters are estimated from time series data to make fore-
casts about the impact of economic policies; however, the Econometric models do not focus enough 
on the optimization behaviour of household and firm. This deficiency can be complimented by DSGE 
framework which generates time series on which forecasts of Econometrics analysis can be as-
sessed. The idea of using both frameworks in this study is also supported by comprehensive analysis 
of Consolo et al. (2009) as they concluded that the combination of DSGE model and FAVAR 
(Econometric) dominates other frameworks. Nevertheless, we are suggesting alternative frame-
works as well as alternative empirical approaches, i.e. Frequentist and Bayesians, in addition to a 
brief account in introductory section. On the ability of empirical methods to lead to a meaningful 
conclusion, Chari (2010, p. 1) made very concise and remarkable comments that “the models are 
purposeful simplifications that serve as guides to the real world; they are not the real world”. Thus, 
in effort to reach to the best estimation and simulation of our optimal policy combination, subject 
study is considering both empirical framework and approaches. Though this element makes this 
study prominent from the previous research acknowledged in above lines, in particular to the UK, 
there is no evidence of this strategy in the subject area of research.
16. Conclusions
In specific to the, under analysis, UK, the macroeconomic policy interaction has not been very popu-
lar among researchers; perhaps, much of the space being given to the EMU. The financial sector of 
the UK also has great significance and contribution towards the economy and national income. 
Since financial crises (2008–2009), the financial markets, particularly bond and stock markets, have 
been very volatile; perhaps, the high volatility of the financial sector was the basic factor resulting in 
the formulation of the FPC by the Bank of England. Hence, on the academic and research side, it re-
quires having deep insight into the role of macroeconomic policies and their interaction for the fi-
nancial sector of the UK.
Moreover, there have been substantial intentional arrangements made into the macroeconomic 
policy framework in the last few years. The last two decades have also seen extraordinary major 
macroeconomic and financial events. It would also be interesting to analyse the implications of 
these institutional changes and events for optimal macroeconomic policy combination and their 
effectiveness for financial stability. Most of the studies on macroeconomic policy analysis have been 
focused on either Econometric or General Equilibrium framework or Bayesians or Frequentist 
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approach; both approaches have their own advantages and limitations. This study has provided an 
exhaustive discussion in the context of existing paradigm and evidence on the subject and concomi-
tantly suggested to consider an alternative empirical framework for the robustness and validity of 
empirical results.
It would be appropriate to acknowledge the limitations of this study as it would also point us to-
wards the potential venues of future research. At first, we acknowledge here that the scope of sub-
ject study has been limited to stock and bond markets due to a limited time horizon. However, the 
future possible extensions could be made to include other aspects of the financial sector, for in-
stance, foreign exchange markets, money markets and even derivative markets would be interest-
ing additions. Secondly, we can also extend this study to a scenario where monetary policy is in the 
liquidity trap; however, considering the limited time horizon, we abstained from going further in this 
direction. Thirdly, on empirical and methodological grounds, the theoretical framework we have 
developed and the critical reasoning we have documented require an empirical validation. Fourth 
and last limitation of this study is related to the particular macroeconomic policy and financial sec-
tor environment of the UK on which we have been focusing on. Considering the fact that the British 
macroeconomic policy intuitions and financial sector are both the most established and ancient in 
the world, as cited in the introduction, the market capitalization as share of national income is the 
highest in the world. Hence, the conclusions and recommendations may not be equally applicable 
and should be taken with a grain of salt when applied to any other economy, particularly to develop-
ing economies. This aspect also provides the rationale for the future research.
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Notes
1. Bank stats (Monetary & Financial Statistics) are official 
symbols and abbreviations 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/ms/sym-
bols.htm.
2. The part of the economy that is concerned with actual 
production of goods and services.
3. This refers to the period before the current financial 
and economic crises that started in 2008.
4. According to Foot (2003), there is no particular defini-
tion of financial stability; however, it could be defined 
in the context of financial assets price volatility (details 
in next sections).
5. In the current economic scenario, interest rates in 
many major economies cannot be cut any much 
further, e.g. in the UK, the current interest rate is 0.5, in 
the US 0 -0.25 and in the Euro zone 0.25%.
6. The Ricardian Equivalence refers to idea that any effort 
by the government to stimulate economy by debt-
financed spending would be counter by the increased 
household savings to pay the higher taxes in future.
7. (a) Expansionary Fiscal– Expansionary Monetary, (b) 
Expansionary Fiscal–Contractionary Monetary, (c) 
Contractionary Fiscal–Contractionary Monetary and (d) 
Contractionary Fiscal–Expansionary Monetary.
8. An economic state where resources are allocated in 
the most efficient manner.
9. Banks and building societies were allowed to swap 
their high-quality mortgage-backed and other securi-
ties for UK Treasury Bills for up to three years.
10.  Headed by Governor of the Bank of England, this com-
mittee would monitor the UK financial sector and its 
effects on the economy.  
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/
news/2011/041.htm
11.  Mishkin (2011) and Niemann and Pichler (2011) the 
optimal combination can be defined as “stance of 
Monetary & Fiscal policy which leads to simultaneous 
positive response from Stock & Bond markets”.
12.  In the light of the Fiscal theory of price level (FTPL), a 
non-Ricardian scenario exists where fiscal policy has 
deterministic effects on price stability (Moreira, Soares, 
Sachsida, & Loureiro, 2011).
13.  Fiscal policy’s golden rule (borrow to invest) and sustain-
able investment rule (Debt-to-GDP 40%) were violated.
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